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Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971: Interpretation and
Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
Although federal statutes' are generally perceived as the source
of antitrust doctrine, the states were actually the initiators of anti-
trust legislation.2 Eclipsed by the federal enactments, 3 these original
state laws have been increasingly ignored.' In Minnesota, for exam-
1. The basic federal antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976),
the Clayton Act, id. §§ 12-27 (1976), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. §§
41-58 (1976).
2. At least thirteen states had laws against trusts, monopolies, and combinations
in restraint of trade prior to the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. See H. THORELU,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST Poucy 155 n.195 (1954). See also N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N SEC-
TION ON ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM. To STUDY NEW YORK ANTITRUST
LAws 6a (1957), [hereinafter cited as 1957 NEW YoRK REPORT], Mosk, State Antitrust
Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement, 21 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J.
358, 363 (1962); Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61
COLUM. L. REv. 1469, 1472-73 (1961).
3. Ironically, legislative history indicates that the Sherman Act-the source of
most present federal antitrust law-was intended to supplement state laws:
This bill . . . has for its . . . object to invoke the aid of the courts of the
United States to deal with the combinations . . . when they affect inju-
riously our foreign and interstate commerce. .. and in this way to supple-
ment the enforcement of the established rules of the common and statute law
by the courts of the several States in dealing with combinations that affect
injurously the industrial liberty of the citizens of these States. It is to arm
the federal courts within the limits of their constitutional power that they
may cooperate with the State courts in checking, curbing and controlling the
most dangerous combinations.
21 CONG. REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Sherman).
4. For example, in a 1956 survey, only five of 35 participating states reported
even a single state antitrust action since World War II. See 1957 NEW YORK REPORT,
supra note 2, app. 1, annex IV. In 1967, only eight states reported a "fairly active"
antitrust enforcement program. See B. BURRUS, INVESTIGATION AND DISCOVERY IN STATE
ANTITRUST 39-40 (1967).
It is not clear why the states reduced their antitrust activity. Two categories of
reasons have been suggested. First, there were substantial technical difficulties in-
volved in enforcing state statutes. The statutes themselves became antiquated, inade-
quate, and increasingly hanaicapped by rstrictive judicial interpretation. See Moody
& Waters Co. v. Case-Moody Pie Corp., 354 Ill. 82, 187 N.E. 813 (1933) (consolidation
of manufacturers accounting for 40-65% of the market not illegal); Deon v. Kirby
Lumber Co., 162 La. 671, 111 So. 55 (1927) (boycott not illegal unless malice shown);
Howle v. Mountain Ice Co., 167 S.C. 41, 165 S.E. 724 (1932) (territorial market division
not illegal). Their sanctions were either too weak or so harsh and arbitrary as to deter
their use. See Address by John J. Miles, Assistant Attorney General for the Common-
wealth of Virginia, 1978 Conference of Western Attorneys General, at 3 (Aug. 7, 1978)
(on file at the Minnesota Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Miles Address]. The state
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ple, initially brisk state enforcement of the 1891 Minnesota antitrust
statute6 lapsed entirely after 1913, 7 and few private litigants invoked
the state statute for anything other than a defense or counterclaim.'
attorneys general lacked antitrust expertise, effective investigative tools, full-time per-
sonnel, and adequate funding. See Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State Antitrust Policy,
39 Tax. L. Rav. 753, 763-65 (1961).
Second, significant motivational barriers hampered enforcement and stalled at-
tempts to correct the technical deficiencies. Although most state legislators publicly
supported the goals of antitrust legislation, they also perceived that strong enforce-
ment of such laws would alienate politically powerful businessmen and might induce
business to locate in less enthusiastic states. Miles Address, supra, at 3 & n.4. Thus,
state legislators tended to discourage antitrust enforcement. This legislative attitude
was complimented by a general lack of interest by the state attorneys general, id., and
the public as a whole. See Wood, Resurgence of State Antitrust Action: Prices and
Public Awareness, 9 ANTrrRUST L. & ECON. Rav. 41, 42 (1977).
5. Between 1891 and 1914, four state-initiated antitrust actions reached the Min-
nesota Supreme Court. See State v. Minneapolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144 N.W.
407 (1913); State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 115 Minn. 207, 132 N.W. 268 (1911);
State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909); State v. St. Paul
Gaslight Co., 92 Minn. 467, 100 N.W. 216 (1904). Another case, also initiated in
Minnesota, was tried in federal court under a theory of pendant jurisdiction. State v.
Northern Sec. Co., 123 F. 692 (D. Minn. 1903), rev'd on juris. grounds, 194 U.S. 48
(1904).
6. Act of Apr. 20, 1891, ch. 10, 1891 Minn. Gen. Laws 82 (repealed 1971).
7. No enforcement efforts were made from 1913 until 1961, when the Attorney
General's Antitrust unit was formed. W. MONDALE, REPORT ON THE ATrORNEY
Ga .PV'S ANTTRUST UNrr's FiRsT YEAm 1 (1962). Even then, little was accomplished
until after 1971. See generally French, The Minnesota Antitrust Law, 50 MiNN. L. REv.
59 (1965); Interview with Alan H. Maclin, Special Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota (Oct. 19, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Ma-
clin Interview].
8. See, e.g., In re Otto's Liquor, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 160 (D. Minn. 1970) (defense
that creditors who filed involuntary petition in bankruptcy against defendant violated
state antitrust law); AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499,
110 N.W.2d 348 (1961) (defense that lease for bowling pin spotting machines that lessor
was seeking to enforce violated state antitrust law); General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
DeMarce, 203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750 (1938) (counterclaim of antitrust tie-in violation
to action for recovery on past due promissory notes); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
Paine & Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 234 N.W. 453 (1931) (in action for breach of
contract, counterclaim that contract violated antitrust laws); Espenson v. Koepke, 93
Minn. 278, 101 N.W. 168 (1904) (in a breach of contract suit, defense of contract void
"as being a restraint of trade").
A few plaintiffs, however, did bring actions under the state antitrust statute prior
to 1971. See, e.g., Red Owl Stores v. Meat Cutters Local 114, 109 F. Supp. 629, appeal
dismissed, 205 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1953); Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n., 226
Minn. 367, 33 N.W.2d 48 (1948); Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators Local
219, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1922); George J. Grant Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg.
Trades Council, 136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 1055 (1917); Ertz v. Produce Exch. Co., 82
Minn. 137, 84 N.W. 743 (1901). Generally, however, Minnesota cases that could have
been tried under the antitrust statute were decided on common law grounds. See, e.g.,
Combined Ins. Co. v. Bode, 247 Minn. 458, 77 N.W.2d 533 (1956) (covenant that former
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Recently, however, state antitrust legislation and enforcement activ-
ity have been revitalized.' Thirty-one states have enacted new anti-
trust statutes since 197010 and four states are actively involved in
preparing new legislation." Antitrust staffs of state attorneys general
have grown,1 2 and states now file many more claims under state law
than under federal antitrust statutes. 3
insurance agents could not solicit in their old territories); Brainerd Dispatch Newspa-
per Co. v. Crow Wing County, 196 Minn. 194, 264 N.W. 779 (1936) (agreement between
newspaper publishers to submit only one bid for county printing contract); People's
Cleaning & Dyeing Co. v. Share, 168 Minn. 474, 210 N.W. 397 (1926) (conditioning of
sale of stock on agreement not to compete); Cain v. Wabasha County, 164 Minn. 142,
204 N.W. 916 (1925) (horizontal combination of newspapers outbid competitor); Gran-
ger v. Craven, 159 Minn. 296, 199 N.W. 10 (1924) (covenant not to compete with
physician after internship); Stronge Warner Co. v. H. Choate & Co., 149 Minn. 30, 182
N.W. 712 (1921) (operation of a retail business by wholesale house in stores of others);
Roraback v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766 (1918)
(boycott by labor); Holliston v. Ernston, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N.W. 415 (1913) (covenant
not to compete in sale of bus and baggage business); Scott-Stafford Opera House Co.
v. Minneapolis Musicians' Ass'n, 118 Minn. 410, 136 N.W. 1092 (1912) (restraints on
musicians imposed by their union); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 233, 55 N.W.
1119 (1893) (horizontal boycott by lumber retailers).
9. The explanations offered for the recent resurgence of state antitrust activity
are as speculative as those suggested for the previous inaction. It has been suggested,
however, that a change in public attitude has made state antitrust enforcement just
"good politics." Miles Address, supra note 4, at 4. Some trace this change in the
political climate to an erosion of public confidence in the federal government's role as
exclusive problem solver. Wood, supra note 4, at 44. Others see the recent growth of
the consumer movement as creating a greater public awareness of price movements
and the lack of price competition in many industries. See Miles Address, supra note
4, at 3; Wood, supra note 4, at 44-45. This public awareness may have been further
heightened by publicity surrounding recent antitrust actions that have resulted in
large damage awards. Perhaps the two most widely publicized cases were the
"Electrical Conspiracy Cases," see C. BANE, ELECTRICAL EQuwmNTr CONSPIRACIES
(1973), and the Tetracycline litigation. See e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co.,
324 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affl'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
871 (1971); Cotler Drugs, Inc. v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
It has also been suggested that the increased involvement of states in multistate
federal antitrust class actions and bid rigging suits has resulted in the antitrust educa-
tion of state attorneys general and their staffs. See Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust
Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L. Rav. 653, 699-70q (1974). Recent increases in private
federal antitrust actions have also broadened the base of antitrust expertise in each
state. Id. at 699.
10. Miles Address, supra note 4, at 5.
11. Id. supra note 4, at 5 & n.8.
12. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATromNES GENERAL, STATE ANTrRUST LAws
AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT 40-41 (1974); Miles Address, supra note 4, app. 3.
13. In a roughly one-year period (1976-1977), state antitrust divisions filed 104
suits under state antitrust law as compared with 56 filed under federal law. Miles
Address, supra note 4, app. 4 (based on data from the National Association of Attor-
19791
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This national trend has not bypassed Minnesota. In 1971, Min-
nesota enacted a comprehensive new state antitrust statute. 4 Since
that time, enforcement of the state law has increased dramatically.
During fiscal year 1978, for example, the Attorney General's Antitrust
Division initiated twenty-five investigations based on the state anti-
trust law5 and filed four state actions." This level of activity is signif-
icant in comparison to that in 1969, when no state actions were filed
under the state antitrust law and less than five percent of the Anti-
trust Division's time was spent on state enforcement."
Two factors suggest that this trend of increased state antitrust
activity is likely to continue. First, increased state activity should be
self-perpetuating. More litigation will increase the exposure of pri-
vate attorneys and businessmen to state antitrust doctrine. This ex-
posure will likely increase the willingness and ability of the state and
private individuals to bring future actions.
In addition, the federal government has begun to encourage
states to take a more active role in antitrust enforcement. The Justice
Department and the Federal Trade Commission, for example, have
responded to larger caseloads by encouraging states to intensify their
antitrust activity and by increasing cooperation with states in inves-
tigation and information sharing." The federal government has also
neys General). As of June 1, 1978, however, the states had 75 antitrust cases pending
under state law while there were 131 state actions pending under federal law. Id., app.
5 (based on data from the National Association of Attorneys General). These latter
statistics may be more indicative of the greater lag time between filing and litigation
and the longer trials connected with federal proceedings than of the comparative
number of state and federal antitrust cases currently being filed by the states.
14. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 865, 1971 Minn. Laws 1715.
15. Minnesota Attorney General's Antitrust Division, State Antitrust Enforce-
ment Grant Program: Self Assessment Report for the State of Minnesota (Aug. 11,
1978) (unpublished memorandum) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
16. This increased the total number of state antitrust actions filed since 1971 to
16. Minnesota Attorney General's Antitrust Division, Antitrust Cases Filed by Year
(1978) (unpublished memorandum) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review). By October
19, 1978, the State Antitrust Division consisted of five attorneys, two investigators, and
two secretaries. Maclin Interview, supra note 7. Even with this increased activity,
however, private actions under the new law remain scarce. As of May 1, 1979, no
private action under the Minnesota antitrust law of 1971 had been decided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.
17. Committee on the Office of Attorney General of the National Association of
Attorneys General, Questionnaire on Antitrust, Blue Sky Laws, and Charitable Trusts,
at 1-2 (1969) (unpublished report) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
18. Address by Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Jus-
tice Dep't Antitrust Division, 1978 Conference of Western Attorneys General, East
Glacier, Montana, at 7 (Aug. 7, 1978) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review)
[hereinafter cited as Ewing Address].
We believe that the solution is not continuing, massive expansion at the
. [Vol. 63:907
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recently begun to fund state enforcement efforts. The United States
Justice Department, through special Congressional appropriation, 9
has awarded substantial grants"0 to forty-five states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico to assist in antitrust enforcement." These
grants will allow the states to double their total antitrust enforcement
personnel" and enable twenty-five states to create antitrust divisions
for the first time.Y Appropriations of additional grants for fiscal year
1979 have been approved by Congress.Y
The encouragement of state antitrust activity by the federal gov-
ernment appears to stem, at least in part, from a recognition that
such activity serves to fill gaps existing in federal antitrust enforce-
ment. While the scope of federal enforcement is extensive,2 it is not
totally comprehensive. Congress has not extended all federal anti-
trust laws to their constitutional limits,2 1 and even in areas in which
Congress has fully used its power to regulate interstate commerce,2
many local enterprises remain outside the reach of federal courtsu or
federal level. Where.problems can be handled locally, they should be, and
in the area of antitrust enforcement, states do have the incentives to protect
their citizens from economic crimes. We welcome state antitrust enforce-
ment and in the last eight months alone we have referred some 21 cases of
more localized violations to the Attorneys General of eleven states.
Id.
19. Crime Control Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976).
20. Grants awarded totalled $10,787,377. Miles Address, supra note 4, app. 2.
The combined state antitrust budgets for 1977, in contrast, were estimated at "not
more than $7 million." Wood, supra note 4, at 42.
21. Miles Address, supra note 4, app. 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Crime Control Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 3739 (1976).
25. The Justice Department's Antitrust Division has a legal staff of 442 and an
annual budget of over $22 million. The Antitrust Bureau of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has more than 200 lawyers and a budget of more than $20 million. Wood, supra
note 4, at 42-43.
26. The Federal Trade Commission Act and §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act apply
only to practices "in commerce" and do not extend to practices merely affecting
commerce. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941); Stern, A Proposed Uniform
State Antitrust Law: Text and Commentary on Draft Statute, 39 TEx. L. Rav. 717,
717 & n.3, 736 n.76, 740 n.96 (1961).
27. In enacting the Sherman Act, for example, Congress fully employed its power
under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n. 322 U.S.
533, 558 (1944), Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940). See also, Stern,
supra note 26,-at 716 n.2.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947) (combination
to exclude competition in operation of local taxicabs); United States v. Starlite Drive-
In, Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953) (price fixing combination of drive-in theatres);
St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Minn.
1970) (restrictive covenant regarding regional shopping center); United States v. Em-
19791
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beyond the practical and budgetary reach of federal enforcement
agencies.2' As a result, the antitrust implications of personal services,
retail marketing, and state public contract bidding have been largely
ignored by the federal government." State enforcement agencies, by
contrast, are not restricted to policing only those activities affecting
interstate commerce, are closer to the alleged violations,3' and may
have a greater comparative "stake" in what might seem like a
"small" violation to federal authorities.32
State antitrust laws also offer private plaintiffs important stra-
tegic advantages not available under the federal laws.? Some state
statutes, for example, codify certain per se violations first recognized
by federal courts24 Thus, as the federal courts become more restric-
ploying Plasterers Ass'n., 138 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (combination to monopolize
plastering contracts). See also Kortinger, The "Essentially Local" Doctrine and Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, 15 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 66, 75-76 (1963).
The impact of this jurisdictional limitation on enforcement of the Sherman Act
is made more significant by the policy of the Justice Department and the FTC not to
pursue many cases they judge to have an insufficient effect on interstate commerce.
See Rubin, supra note 9, at 700 & n.327.
29. See Ewing Address, supra note 18, at 6-7:
Federal resources are simply not sufficient to enable us to investigate and
prosecute all of the violations that experience leads us to believe are
occur[r]ing. The smaller cases-smaller, but no less significant to their
victims-require the attention and diligence that state enforcement authori-
ties can bring. The Antitrust Division and the Bureau of Competition of the
Federal Trade Commission between us have fewer than 1,000 attorneys, an
impossibly small number to police an ecomony approaching $2 trillion in
gross national product.
30. See Johnson, The Role of State Antitrust Enforcement in Oregon, 21
ANTrrRUST BuLL. 611, 614 (1976).
31. This results in greater ease of detection and investigation, see Hanson, & von
Kalinowski, The Status of State Antitrust Laws with Federal Analysis, 15 CASE W.
Rls. L. Rxv. 9, 31 (1963), less travel time and expense during pretrial and trial proceed-
ings, and a better opportunity to engage in informal remedies. See, e.g., Fellmeth,
Antitrust Enforcement by Local Prosecutors: Impediments and Prospects, 14 CAL. W.
L. REV. 1 (1978).
32. This is especially true in the area of anticompetitive bidding for public con-
tracts of state and their political subdivisions. See Note, The Present Revival and
Future Course of State Antitrust Enforcement, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 585 (1963).
33. On the other hand, some attorneys may choose to litigate their antitrust
claims in federal court, since the greater case law authority on federal antitrust ques-
tions may provide more certainty concerning questions of interpretation. See Granger,
A Glimpse at Plaintiff's Remedies Under the Kansas Antitrust Laws, 8 WASHBURN L.J.
1, 10 (1969); Miles Address, supra note 4, at 9 n.21. Moreover, federal court judges'
greater experience with antitrust litigation makes them less susceptible to the signifi-
cant delaying and hindering tactics available to the defense in an antitrust action. See
generally Fellmeth, supra note 31, at 30; Comment, Colorado Antitrust Law: Untied
and Drifting, 48 U. COL. L. REv. 215, 232 (1977).
34. See Inman, The Uniform State Antitrust Act: A Review and Commentary,
[Vol. 63:907
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tive in defining the reach of the doctrine of per se illegality,n certain
state antitrust laws may become more advantageous to plaintiffs.38
Antitrust litigation in a state court is, in addition, generally shorter
in duration than actions brought in federal courts.3 1 Finally, an action
under a state antitrust law may partially neutralize an opponent's
greater antitrust experience with federal law.
As a result of the recent increase in state antitrust activity, as
well as the differences between the state and federal laws, the Minne-
sota legal and business community will become increasingly involved
in the intracacies of the Minnesota antitrust law. Equally important
to Minnesota lawyers and businessmen is information about present
state antitrust enforcement philosophies and procedures. This Note
explores both of these areas, and suggests changes in the Minnesota
Antitrust Law of 1971.
I. HISTORY OF THE MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW OF 1971
The .1891 Minnesota antitrust statute," even as amended," pos-
14 AM. Bus. L.J. 171, 180 (1976). See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38 §§ 60-1 to -11 (Smith-
Hurd 1977); MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(1) (1978).
35. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
36. Accord, Maclin Interview, supra note 7.
37. See generally Miles Address, supra note 4, at 22.
38. See Granger, supra note 33, at 12.
Additionally, of course, a plaintiff in an action brought under a state antitrust law
need not allege or prove an effect on interstate commerce. See e.g. MINN. STAT. §
325.8028 (1978). Moreover, there are cost and convenience advantages to a local court
forum not necessarily available in the federal court system, especially in light of the
possibility that the federal Multidistrict Litigation Act may dictate that the proper
federal forum is in a distant locale. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1973). See Granger, supra note
44, at 12.
39. Act of Apr. 20, 1891, ch. 10, 1891 Miuin. Gen. Laws 82 (repealed 1971).
40. From 1891 to 1971 the Minnesota antitrust act was the subject of several
amendments. In 1899, the provisions of the act were elaborated and re-enacted. Act of
Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, 1899 Minn. Laws 487 (repealed 1971). The 1899 version general-
ized the definition of what constituted a restraint of trade and added a provision
dealing with anticompetitive mergers. It made any violation of the antitrust act a
felony punishable by a minimum fine of $500 or a three to five-year imprisonment. Any
corporation in violation of the law would suffer mandatory forfeiture of its right to do
business. Any contract violating the act was made void. The scope of the act was
further extended to any person who either entered "any correspondence, negotiations
or agreement in this state" with the purpose of negotiating a contract or combination
in violation of the act or who, being a Minnesota resident, entered another state for
the purpose of engaging in such negotiations or agreement. Standing to sue was given
to any citizen of Minnesota. The duty of enforcement was placed on the state attorney
general. The 1891 provision relating to discovery was deleted. In 1901, boycotts were
explicitly made illegal, labor organizations were exempted, and provisions were made
for recovery of treble damages under the act. The jurisdiction of the district courts and
the courts' subpoena powers under the antitrust law were defined. Act of Apr. 10, 1901,
19791
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sessed many of the weaknesses common to most state antitrust stat-
utes. Such deficiencies included mandatory, harsh penalties for all
violations," judicial restriction of the statute to purely intrastate
transactions, 2 and uncertainty as to whether federal or Minnesota
case law controlled the interpretation of the state statute. 3
In response to these problems, the Attorney General's office
began considering a new antitrust statute as early as 1963,11 and in
1971 provided the original working draft of the bill that was ulti-
mately adopted. 5 The original draft of the bill was based primarily
on the first tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act," al-
though the Illinois Antitrust Act of 1967 was also relied on in drafting
ch. 194, 1901 Minn. Laws 269 (repealed 1971). In 1913, the procedure for readmittance
of foreign corporations "ousted from [the] state" because of a prior antitrust violation
was established. Act of Apr. 22, 1913, ch. 378, 1913 Minn. Laws 527 (repealed 1971).
In 1923, the provision dealing with anticompetitive mergers was amended to give the
state attorney general power to make a pre-merger determination as to the legality of
the proposed merger. Act of Apr. 13, 1923, ch. 251, § 1, 1923 Minn. Laws 310 (repealed
1971).
41. The penalty for individuals was a mandatory fine of not less than $500 or a
minimum of three years in a state prison. Domestic corporations were punished with
a mandatory charter forfeiture, and the penalty for a foreign corporation was manda-
tory loss of the privilege to do business. Act of Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, § 3, 1899 Minn.
Laws 487, amended by, Act of Apr. 18, 1905, ch. 103, § 5169, 1905 Minn. Rev. Laws
1088 (promulgated by Revision Commission authorized to codify extant law by Act of
Apr. 11, 1901, ch. 241, 1901 Minn. Laws 383) (repealed 1971). A foreign corporation
doing business within Minnesota, however, could be regranted its privilege to do busi-
ness by filing an affidavit stating the corporation was no longer violating the law. Act
of Apr. 22, 1913, ch. 378, 1913 Minn. Laws 527 (repealed 1971). Walter Rockenstein,
former Special Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, stated in a 1972 inter-
view that the mandatory forfeiture plus the discrimination against domestic corpora-
tions was the major reason for non-enforcement of the pre-1971 statute. Interview with
Walter Rockenstein, then Special Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, in
St. Paul, Minnesota (Nov. 28, 1972). See also French, supra note 7, at 78.
42. See AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 507-08,
110 N.W.2d 348, 353-54 (1961). But see French, supra note 7, at 60-62; 46 MINN. L.
REv. 1135 (1962).
43. French, supra note 7, at 78.
44. Minnesota Attorney General's Antitrust Division, Memorandum on Revision
of Antitrust Laws (unpublished memorandum) (n.d.) (internal references indicate the
time frame was 1962-1963) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
45. S. Crecelius, then Special Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,
Memorandum to Legislative File on Antitrust Legislation (Jan. 29, 1971) (unpublished
memorandum) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
46. UNIFORM STATE ANTIRrUsT Acr (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963) [hereinafter cited
as UNIFORM DRAFT] printed in [1963] National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws Annual Meeting § 12 (Aug. 5-10, 1963). See S. Crecelius, supra note
56. But see Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Indictment and Sup-
press Evidence, at 3; State v. Robert L. Carr. Co., [1978-1] Trade Cases 61,983
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty. Mar. 31, 1978) (suggesting that the second draft of the
act was relied on). In any event, the first and second drafts were essentially identical.
[Vol. 63:907
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several important provisions. 7 The Attorney General's office elimi-
nated from the original draft language concerning conspiracies to
monopolize and a clause exempting exclusive franchise arrangements
from per se scrutiny. The office also conditioned the Attorney Gen-
eral's authority to act on the existence of "reasonable cause."4 Dur-
ing subsequent senate consideration, further changes were incorpo-
rated: provisions making consciously parallel behavior circumstan-
tial proof of an agreement" and expressly exempting exclusive deal-
ing arrangements from per se treatment were deleted; 50 general ex-
emptions for electrical cooperatives and collective bargaining were
added;5' willful violations of per se offenses were elevated from misde-
meanor to felony status; 2 civil fine minimums were eliminated;5 3 and
trebling of damages was made mandatory. Finally, the statute's
provision for liability of corporate employees was altered to condition
liability on "knowing" participation in the acts constituting the vio-
lation.5
m1. INTERPRETING THE MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW OF
1971
The proper interpretation of many provisions of the 1971 Minne-
sota antitrust law remains unsettled. This result is due both to a lack
While the Uniform Draft had not been formally approved by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it had, by 1971, received national
attention as one of the leading prototypes for state antitrust law. See, e.g., Arnold &
Ford, Uniform State Antitrust Act: Toward Creation of a National Antitrust Policy,
15 CAsE W. REs. L. Rav. 102 (1963); French, supra note 7, at 81. The Uniform State
Antitrust Act was finally approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1974. This 1974 version, however, differs substantially from the
first tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act and remains largely unadopted
by the states. See Miles Address, supra note 3, at 5.
47. Act of July 21, 1965, 1965 11. Laws 1943, amended by Act of June 25, 1969,
P.A. 76-208, 1969 Ill. Laws 301 (codified at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 60-1 to -11
(Smith-Hurd 1977)). While the extent of the reliance placed on the Illinois Act cannot
be precisely measured, its influence may be seen in areas such as the definition of
services, MiNN. STAT. § 325.8012(3) (1978), the requirement of "willfulness" for crimi-
nal conviction, MiNN. STAT. § 325.8018(2) (1978), and the prohibition of action by the
Attorney General without "reasonable cause." MaiN. STAT. § 325.8021 (1978).
48. Compare S. Crecelius, supra note 45, with S.F. 1200,67th Minn. Legis., 1971
Sess. (bill as introduced).
49. [1971] Minnesota Journal of the Senate 1061 (Apr. 12, 1971).
50. Id. at 1060.
51. Id. at 2355-56 (May 7, 1971).
52. Id. at 1060 (Apr. 12, 1971).
53. Id. at 1896 (Apr. 30, 1971).
54. Id. at 1060 (Apr. 12, 1971).
55. Id. at 2356 (May 7, 1971).
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of litigated cases and questions as to the weight to be given other
authority. Before turning to the provisions of the act itself, it is neces-
sary to examine the availability and utility of various interpretative
aids.
A. INTERPRETATiVE AIDs
1. Minnesota Case Law
Minnesota case law provides little enlightenment on antitrust
matters. While there has been significant state antitrust activity
since 1971, most cases have ended in informal settlements, consent
decrees, assurances of discontinuance,56 or unappealed and unre-
ported57 district court decisions. Consequently, there is a complete
absence of appellate decisions interpreting the new antitrust law.5
Pre-1971 Minnesota antitrust decisions are of dubious value in
interpreting the present statute. While other states, in order to per-
petuate existing local antitrust doctrine, attempted merely to reform
state statutes,59 the Minnesota Legislature adopted an entirely new
and comprehensive antitrust statute." Minnesota's refusal to adopt
a more limited approach suggests that the new statute was not in-
56. See Maclin Interview, supra note 7.
57. While the antitrust looseleaf services have recently begun more extensive
reporting of state antitrust activities, see Miles Address, supra note 4, at 5, the only
Minnesota case they have reported is State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-1] Trade
Cases 61,983 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty. Mar. 31, 1978). In that case, the Minnesota
Fifth District Court rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss a state criminal action
alleging price fixing in public contract bids.
58. In Harris v. Bolin, 310 Minn. 391, 247 N.W.2d 600 (1976), the Minnesota
Supreme Court held, apparently under common law, that a forfeiture clause in a
profit-sharing plan constituted an unlawful restraint of trade. MNN. STAT. § 325.8013
(1978) was cited only as evidence of a Minnesota policy disfavoring anticompetitive
provisions and was not the basis of the decision.
59. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 701.
60. Some of the substantive language of the pre-1971 statute is reflected in the
new statute. Compare Act of Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, § 1, 1899 Minn. Laws 487, amended
by Act of Apr. 13, 1923, ch. 251, 1923 Minn. Laws 311 (repealed 1971) with MINN. STAT.
§ 325.8013 (1978) (prohibition of unreasonable restraints of trade); compare also Act
of Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, § 3, 1899 Minn. Laws 487, amended by Act of Apr. 18, 1905,
ch. 103, § 5169, 1905 Minn. Rev. Laws 1088 (promulgated by Revision Commission
authorized to codify extant law by Act of Apr. 11, 1901, ch. 241, 1901 Minn. Laws 383
(repealed 1971) with Mm. STAT. § 325.8022 (1978) (provisions for forfeiture of charters
and franchises).
Even in those areas, however, there are differences. Under the pre-1971 law, for
example, forfeiture was automatic upon a finding of guilt, but under the current law,
forfeiture can never be used as a penalty until the offender has violated a final judg-
ment or decree. Even then, use of forfeiture is in the discretion of the court. MINN.
STAT. § 325.8022 (1978).
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tended to be interpreted in light of past state antitrust decisions.6 '
Even if the pre-1971 decisions are considered as more than merely
persuasive authority, few of them offer useful guidance. 2 Of those
few, some relate to areas exempted from the 1971 law or reach re-
61. Another feasible interpretation for the legislature's refusal to retain the sub-
stantive language of the pre-1971 statute is that it desired to replace the vague and
outdated language with more sophisticated and comprehensive terminology. It may
be argued that the pre-1971 law had as "its objective the same purposes as the cur-
rent statute." Therefore, according to one court, "the rationale of [pre-1971] deci-
sion[s] . . . [applies] as well under the current antitrust statute as . . . under the
prior antitrust statute." Anderson v. Marshall Publishing Co., No. CV78064, at 4
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., Nov. 6, 1978) (memorandum and order).
62. Annotations to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.81 indicate that there were 27 deci-
sions "relating" to the pre-1971 law. Only nine of those provide substantive interpreta-
tion of that law. See Red Owl Stores, Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 114, 109 F. Supp.
629 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 205 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1953) (complaint that plain-
tiff's employees union and plaintiff's competitors combined to force plaintiff to close
at night states a cause of action); State v. Northern Sec. Co., 123 F. 692 (D. Minn.
1903), rev'd on juris. grounds, 194 U.S. 48 (1904) (holding company of two competing
railroads that has no power to operate either railroad, not a restraint of trade); Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass Co. v. Paine & Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 234 N.W. 453 (1931)
(contract whereby manufacturer agreed not to solicit contract work in particular locale
and to sell exclusively to two local dealers who had a requirements contract with
manufacturer held not restraint of trade); Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Opera-
tors Local 219, 151 Minn. 220, 186 N.W. 781 (1922) (combination to boycott theater is
restraint of trade); George J. Grant Const. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council, 136
Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 1055 (1917) (union strike not restraint of trade); State v. Minne-
apolis Milk Co., 124 Minn. 34, 144 N.W. 407 (1913) (reasonableness of price no defense
to price-fixing); State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909)
(setting of commission rates by board of trade not restraint of trade); Espenson v.
Koepke, 93 Minn. 278, 101 N.W. 168 (1904) (definition of "article, commodity or
utility"); Ertz v. Produce Exch. Co., 82 Minn. 137, 84 N.W. 743 (1901) (association of
dealers that controls the delivery of goods by its members is restraint of trade).
Of the remaining 18 cases, five dealt with procedural issues. See In re Otto's
Liquor, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 160 (D. Minn. 1970) (whether injury caused by creditors'
violation of state antitrust law is defense in bankruptcy); AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v.
Harkins Bowling Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 110 N.W.2d 348 (1962) (whether statute extends
to interstate activities); Miller v. Minneapolis Underwriters Ass'n, Inc., 226 Minn. 367,
33 N.W.2d 48 (1948) (availability of injunctive relief under the statute); State v.
Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 115 Minn. 207, 132 N.W. 268 (1911) (whether court has
discretion in imposing forfeiture of charter as penalty); Disbrow v. Creamery Package
Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 237, 125 N.W. 115 (1910) (whether antitrust claim was improperly
united with another claim). In the remaining 13 cases, the state antitrust statute was
not the basis for decision, see e.g., Saint Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores,
Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Minn. 1970); General Talking Pictures Corp. v. DeMarce,
203 Minn. 28, 279 N.W. 750 (1938); State v. St. Paul Gaslight Co., 92 Minn. 467, 100
N.W. 216 (1904), or was not cited at all. See note 8 supra.
63. See Campbell v. Motion Picure Mach. Operators Local 219, 151 Minn. 220,
186 N.W. 781 (1922); George J. Grant Const. Co. v. St. Paul Bldg. Trades Council,
136 Minn. 167, 161 N.W. 1055 (1917). Both cases involved allegations that labor union
activities were violations of the state antitrust law. Activities by unions are expressly
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sults in direct opposition to present provisions."
2. Federal Antitrust Doctrine
Although federal antitrust case law is extensively developed, 5 its
ultimate precedential impact on state cases is uncertain. Under the
pre-1971 statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because
"[t]he Minnesota anti-trust law [was] . . .framed along the lines.
of the federal statute," the Minnesota courts should "look to the
decisions made under [the] federal . . statutes of a similar charac-
ter for the principle by which to construe our own statute."" The
Minnesota court, under the pre-1971 law, adhered to this rule of
harmonious construction even to the extent of overruling prior Min-
nesota precedent to reflect changes in federal doctrine. 7
The continued application of this rule of conformity is uncertain.
First, since the 1971 law may be seen as a clean break from the prior
law, 8 principles of construction established by prior Minnesota cases
arguably have no special value in interpreting the new statute. Sec-
ond, the rule of uniform construction was premised on the fact that
the 1891 act was adopted from the Sherman Act." The 1971 law, by
contrast, was founded largely on the first tentative draft of the
Uniform State Antitrust Act 0 and the Illinois Antitrust Act." Fur-
thermore, the language of the current Minnesota law differs greatly
from the language of the Sherman Act. In Colorado, similar differ-
ences in language between the state antitrust law and the Sherman
Act led one court to determine that "it would be unwarranted to
assume that the [state] . . . legislature intended to adopt the case
exempted from coverage of the current antitrust law. See MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(1),(3)
(1978).
64. See State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909),
holding that there was no restraint of trade when a board of trade established commis-
sion rates for its members and fined those who charged less. The 1971 Act makes such
price-fixing illegal per se. MwN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(1)(a) (1978).
65. See Granger, supra note 33, at 10-11.
66. State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 517, 121 N.W. 395, 399 (1909).
See also State v. Northern Sec. Co., 123 F.692 (D. Minn. 1903), rev'd onjuris. grounds
194 U.S. 48 (1904).
67. See Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach. Operators Local 219, 151 Minn. 220,
186 N.W. 781 (1922) in which the court relied on federal decisions to limit State v.
Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 121 N.W. 395 (1909), which had held the state
antitrust law inapplicable to personal services.
68. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
69. See State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 517, 121 N.W. 395, 399
(1909).
70. UNIFORM DRAFt, supra note 46. See text accompanying note 46, supra.
71. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§ 60-1 to -11 (Smith-Hurd 1977). See text accompany-
ing note 47 supra.
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law interpreting the Federal statutes."72 It is also significant that the
Illinois Antitrust Act includes a provision expressly incorporating
"the construction given to the Federal Law by the Federal Courts. '73
The original working draft of the 1971 Minnesota antitrust statute
also included such a provision.74 That provision, however, was deleted
prior to the bill's introduction, 75 suggesting that the statute's authors
did not favor reliance on federal antitrust developments for construc-
tion of the new state statute. 71
There are, on the other hand, compelling reasons for continuing
the application of the rule of uniform construction. First, although
the 1971 statute was not specifically adopted from the Sherman Act,
the new statute is, in large measure, a detailed codification of the
federal Sherman Act case law as it existed in 1971. 71 Indeed, the 1971
law mirrors federal substantive antitrust precedent more accurately
than did the pre-1971 statute. Since the Minnesota courts found the
prior state antitrust law sufficiently similar to the federal law to allow
harmonious construction, the current statute should be given similar
treatment.78 In addition, the elimination of the provision expressly
incorporating federal interpretation into the current Minnesota stat-
ute 7 was not necessarily a rejection of the incorporation principle.
The deletion may merely signify that the authors of the 1971 Minne-
sota act thought that such language was unnecessary in light of the
then-existing judicial rule of uniform construction. Moreover, other
states incorporate federal antitrust precedent into their statutes with-
out any express legislative directive."
72. Q-T Markets, Inc. v. Fleming Cos. Inc., 394 F. Supp. 1102, 1106 (D. Colo.
1975). This decision, however, has been strongly criticized. See Comment, supra note
33.
73. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 § 60-11 (Smith-Hurd 1977) ("When the language of
this Act is the same or similar to the language of a Federal Anti-trust Law, the courts
of this state in construing this Act shall follow the construction given to the Federal
Law by the Federal Courts.").
74. See S. Crecelius, supra note 45, at § 27 ("When the language of this Act is
the same or similar to the language of a Federal Antitrust Law, the courts of this state
in construing this Act shall follow the construction given to the Federal Law by the
Federal Court.").
75. See S.F. No. 1200, 67th Minn. Legis., 1971 Sess.
76. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
77. State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-1] Trade Cases 61,983 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Lyon Cty., Mar. 31, 1978). See also U~mom DRAFr, supra note 46, Prefatory Note 3-
4.
78. See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra.
80. See, e.g., Shasta Douglas Oil Co. v. Work, 212 Cal. App. 2d 618, 625, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 190, 195 (1963); Manhattan Storage & Warehouse Co. v. Movers & Warehouse-
men's Ass'n, 262 A.D. 332, 335, 28 N.Y.S.2d 594, 597 (1941); Pulp Wood Co. v. Green
Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 157 Wis. 604, 616, 147 N.W. 1058, 1062 (1914).
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Policy considerations also suggest that interpretation of the state
law should be consistent with federal precedent, especially in the area
of substantive offenses. Without a rule of uniform construction be-
tween state and federal antitrust laws, it may be more difficult for
business operations, subject to federal as well as state law, to predict
the antitrust implications of their business decisions.8 Efficient coor-
dination of federal and state enforcement is, in addition, aided by a
policy of uniform interpretation.2
On balance, the Minnesota antitrust laws should be interpreted
uniformly with federal court interpretations of the Sherman Act."
Exceptions should be made in three situations. First, if federal inter-
pretation is clearly in conflict with the 1971 law, the state legisla-
ture's intent, as expressed in the 1971 law, should prevail. Second, if
a Minnesota Supreme Court decision clearly indicates its reasons for
following a then-current federal interpretation or consciously departs
from the then-current federal interpretation, later differing interpre-
tations by the federal courts should not automatically take preced-
ence. When, however, the Minnesota court makes a ruling primarily
on the ground of uniformity with the then-viable federal case law,
later differing federal interpretation should be controlling. Finally,
the rule of uniform construction should carry substantially less
weight with regard to the 1971 law's procedural provisions, since
these provisions are significantly different from the analogous federal
provisions. Moreover, federal-state incongruence in this area would
not generate the same problems in business planning.
3. Other Sources of Interpretation
As previously noted, the 1971 antitrust law is based largely on
the first tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust Act. 8" Reliance
on the comments to the Uniform Draft relating to sections taken
from the Draft would thus usually be permissible." Since the Minne-
81. See French, supra note 7, at 72-74; Stern, supra note 26, at 718.
82. See generally UNIFoRm DRAFT, supra note 46, Prefatory Note 2.
83. The rule of uniform construction should be limited to the case law interpreta-
tion of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, since provisions analogous to the substantive
portions of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts were not included in the
1971 Minnesota Antitrust Act. See note 126 infra.
84. UNu moP DRAr, supra note 46. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
85. The Uniform Draft, see note 46, supra, contains a prefatory note and com-
mentary after each section. These provide a detailed explanation of the policy and
purpose of the Uniform Draft.
86. MINN. STAT. § 645.22 (1978) states, "Laws uniform with those of other states
shall be interpreted and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the
laws of those states which enact them."
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sota antitrust act was drafted by the Attorney General rather than
the legislature,87 however, there is no assurance that the legislature
considered the comments to the Uniform Draft when enacting the
1971 bill. The Attorney General's office did, however, consider both
the Uniform Draft and its comments.s The general rule that the
understanding of the drafters of a statute should be given authorita-
tive weight," even when the drafters are not legislators, thus man-
dates that the Uniform Draft and its comments be considered in
interpreting the Minnesota act.
The Illinois Antitrust Act of 1967 was also the basis for portions
of the 1971 Minnesota antitrust law." The general rule is that stat-
utes borrowed from other states incorporate that state's existing judi-
cial interpretation of the statute." The commentary to the Illinois act
contains the legislative history of that act and the Illinois advisory
committee comments. 2 The Minnesota court has deemed such legis-
lative commentary important in determining the interpretation to be
accorded the state's statutes. 3 Hence, the comments relating to cop-
The Minnesota Supreme Court has ruled that the intention of the drafters of
uniform acts becomes the legislative intent of the Minnesota Legislature upon enact-
ment of a uniform law, and has further indicated that under § 645.25, comments to
uniform laws are authority for interpreting a Minnesota enactment of a uniform law.
See Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 290 n.13, 123
N.W.2d 371, 376 n.13 (1963) (notes of Commissioners used to resolve ambiguity in
Minnesota Uniform Arbitration Act).
87. See notes 44-45 supra.
88. See S. Crecelius, supra note 45.
89. See State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521 (1966) (one
of the most reliable indicators of legislative intent in construing the revised criminal
code is comments of the extra-legislative advisory committee that assisted the legisla-
ture in revising the code).
90. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
91. In construing the Minnesota comparative negligence statute derived from a
similar Wisconsin law, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, "While it is not an
inflexible rule, normally when we adopt a statute from another state which has been
interpreted by the highest court of that state, we take the interpretation with the
statute." Olson v. Hartwig, 288 Minn. 375, 377, 180 N.W.2d 870, 872 (1970). See also
Minnesota Baptist Convention v. Pillsbury Academy, 246 Minn. 46, 51-53, 74 N.W.2d
286, 290-91 (1955); State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262, 266, 232 N.W. 331, 333 (1930)
(dictum).
92. The annotations to the act contain commentary by the Committee on Anti-
trust Law of the Chicago Bar Association, and "Historical and Practical Notes" by
Philip W. Tone and John G. Stifler, made in 1967 and 1970.
93. See, e.g., Gale v. Commissioner of Taxation, 228 Minn. 345, 349-50, 37
N.W.2d 711, 715-16 (1949) (in construction of a tax statute, consideration of legislative
history is always proper); State v. Johnson, 273 Minn. 394, 399, 141 N.W.2d 517, 521
(1966) (in construction of a criminal statute, comments of advisory committees are
valuable).
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ied Illinois provisions should be considered in resolving interpretative
problems.94
B. THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1971 LAw
The Minnesota Antitrust Law. of 1971 is composed of eighteen
separate sections. The provisions deal with the jurisdiction and scope
of the act," definition of offenses," exemptions,97 civil remedies,"
criminal sanctions," enforcement authority,'" collateral estoppel,",
statute of limitations,' 2 and venue."0 3 Each area can be examined in
terms of general content, applicable specific sources of interpretation,
and special problems of construction.
1. Jurisdiction and Scope
The threshold jurisdictional limitation on state antitrust actions
is the requirement that the state have personal jurisdiction over all
parties.' Additional jurisdictional boundaries of the Minnesota anti-
trust law are defined by sections 325.801605 and 325.8028.' 0  Section
94. Pre-1971 Illinois decisions relating to provisions of the Illinois antitrust law
that are duplicated in the Minnesota law are also of interpretative value. Cf. Hunt v.
Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn. 77, 172 N.W.2d 292 (1969) (Minnesota court relied on
Illinois court interpretation of Illinois statute that was the basis for Minnesota's long
arm statute). Post-1971 Illinois decisions, of course, are of less value. Cf. State v.
Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 585-87, 20 N.W.2d 673, 677-78 (1945) (New York decision
rendered after Minnesota's adoption of a similar municipal corporation statute held
not controlling).
95. MN. STAT. §§ 325.8012, .8016, .8028 (1978).
96. Id. §§ 325.8013-.8015.
97. Id. § 325.8017.
98. Id. §§ 325.8018(1), .8019, .8020, .8022, .8023.
99. Id. § 325.8018(2).
100. Id. §§ 325.8021, .8025.
101. Id. § 325.8024.
102. Id. § 325.8026.
103. Id. § 325.8027.
104. See id. § 543.19; see generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 & n.23
(1977) (test for applying jurisdiction is same for in rem as for in personam; the court
must have "jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing" hence "[aill proceed-
ings ... are really against persons.").
105. Mn. STAT. § 325.8016 (1978):
Sections 325.8011 to 325.8028 apply to:
(a) any contract, combination, or conspiracy when any part thereof was
created, formed, or entered into in this state; and
(b) any contract, combination, or conspiracy, wherever created, formed,
or entered into; any establishment, maintenance, or use of monopoly power;
and any attempt to establish, maintain, or use of monopoly power; whenever
any of the foregoing affects the trade or commerce of this state.
106. Id. § 325.8028 ("No action under sections 325.8011 to 325.8028 shall be
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325.8016 "in effect, conditions the application of the Act upon some
reasonable connection with the prosecuting state."''0 It is clear from
subsection (a) of section 325.8016 that such a "connection" with Min-
nesota is formed if a contract or conspiracy is entered into within the
territorial boundaries of the state.' 8 Slightly more ambiguous is the
subsection (b) definition of a "reasonable connection" as conduct
that "affects the trade or commerce of this state."'' 0 Although the
necessary level of effect on Minnesota trade and commerce is uncer-
tain, reasonable construction of those words would suggest that con-
duct sufficiently affects trade or commerce if it causes some identifia-
ble change in economic activity in Minnesota or economically injures
a person in Minnesota. °10
Section 325.8028111 ensures, however, that state jurisdiction will
not depend on whether the alleged illegal activity is intrastate or
interstate in nature.' The provision is consistent with recent author-
ity suggesting that state antitrust laws are not preempted by federal
law and that states may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the
federal government."' Despite the broad sweep of the language in
section 325.8028, however, there still may be federal constitutional
limitations as to the burden the 1971 law may place on interstate
commerce."'
barred on the ground that the activity or conduct complained of in any way affects or
involves interstate or foreign commerce.").
107. UNIFoRm DRmT, supra note 46, at § 5, Comment. The Illinois Antitrust Act
includes no such provision.
108. See MoNN. STAT. § 325.8016(a) (1978).
109. See id. § 325.8016(b).
110. An example of such an effect would be the purchase of a foreign commodity
in Minnesota that carries the effect of an antitrust violation with it, such as higher
prices. This situation is analogous to products liability cases in which the injection of
defective goods into a state is sufficient to uphold jurisdiction. See id. §
543.19(1)(d)(2).
111. Id. § 325.8028; see note 106 supra.
112. The section duplicates a 1969 amendment to the Illinois Antitrust Act, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7.9 (Smith-Hurd 1977), adopted by the Illinois Legislature in
response to court decisions that the Illinois Act did not apply to interstate transactions.
See e.g., Kosuga v. Kelly, 257 F.2d 48, 55 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 358
U.S. 516 (1958); Vendo Co. v. Stoner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 261, 297-99, 245 N.E.2d 263,
281-82 (1969); Soma, Enforcement Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, 5 Loy. Cm. L.J.
25, 28 & n.19. A similar decision was reached with regard to the pre-1971 Minnesota
statute. See AMF Pinspotters, Inc. v. Harkins Bowling, Inc., 260 Minn. 499, 508, 110
N.W.2d 348, 354 (1961); note 42 supra.
113. See Mantzoros, Federal-State Antitrust Jurisdiction, 9 N.Y.L.F. 74, 74, 81
(1963); Pollock, Federal Preemption and State Antitrust Enforcement, 43 Cm. B. Rsc.
145, 145-46 (1961); Rahl, supra note 4, at 756-57, Sieker, State and Federal Relations
in Antitrust Cases-Many Questions and Few Answers, 9 N.Y.L.F. 199, 203-204 (1963);
Stern, supra note 26, at 720; Note, supra note 2.
114. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282-84 (1972) (Court refused to
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The activities covered by the 1971 law are delineated in section
325.8012, which defines the key terms appearing in the other provi-
sions of the act.' The definitions given "commodity,""' "service,"" 7
and "trade and commerce""' make it clear that all activities related
allow application of a state antitrust law to baseball's reserve system, citing the state
regulation's conflict with federal policy, the need for national uniformity in the
operation of the reserve system, and the burden on interstate commerce).
115. MINN. STAT. § 325.8012 (1978) provides,
Subdivision 1. Unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by the
context, for the purposes of sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, the terms defined
in this section have the meanings ascribed to them.
Subd. 2. "Commodity" means any goods, merchandise, wares, produce,
chose in action, land, article of commerce, or any other tangible or intangible
property, real, personal, or mixed for use, consumption, enjoyment, or resale.
Subd. 3. "Service" means any kind of activity performed in whole or in
part for financial gain.
Subd. 4. "Contract, combination, or conspiracy" means any agreement,
arrangement, collusion, or understanding. "Contract" includes a purchase,
a contract to purchase, a sale, a contract to sell, a lease, a contract to lease,
a license, or a contract to license. "Combination" includes a trust, common
selling or purchasing agent, pool, or holding company.
Subd. 5. "Person" means any individual, corporation, firm, partnership,
incorporated and unincorporated association, or any other legal or commer-
cial entity.
Subd. 6. "Trade or commerce" means any economic activity of any type
whatsoever involving any commodity or service whatsoever.
116. Id. at § 325.8012(2). This definition duplicates the UNIFORM DRAFr, supra
46, at § 1(1). The comment, to this section states, "This statute is intended to cover
all subjects of commerce. The purpose of this definition is to assure that all non-service
subjects of commerce are included."
117. MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(3) (1978). This subsection is taken from ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 60-4 (1977). The Historical and Practical Notes to section 60-4 of the
Illinois Act state, "The broad definition of 'service' also makes it clear that . . . all
types of service industries are to be subject to the provisions of the act." Tone & Stifler,
Historical and Practical Notes-1967, appended to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-4
(1977). The Uniform Draft, see note 46, supra, did not define "service." MINN. STAT.
§ 325.8012(3) (1978), eliminates one of the seeming weaknesses of the prior law, which
related only to "article[s] of trade" and left out the important area of services.
Service-related industries accounted for 42% of the United States' gross national prod-
uct in 1970. Almstedt & Tyler, State Antitrust Laws: New Directions in Missouri, 39
Mo. L. Rav. 489, 496 (1974). The court, however, in Campbell v. Motion Picture Mach.
Operators Local 219, 151 Minn. 220, 231-32, 186 N.W. 781, 784-85 (1922), did interpret
"article of trade" to include labor union activity and thus, by analogy, services. Moreo-
ver, while the "restraint[s] of trade" section of the pre-1971 law applied only to
"article[s] of trade, manufacture, or use," the merger or "consolidation" segment of
§ 325.81(1) did relate to services.
118. MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(6) (1978) is taken in substance from § 1(5) of the
Uniform Draft. The commentary to the section states, "The purpose of this definition
is to guarantee coverage of all subjects of commerce when the Act uses 'trade or
commerce' rather than 'commodity or service."' UNEFORM DRAFt, supra note 46, at §
1(5), Comment.
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to achieving economic gain within the competitive marketplace and
not specifically exempted by section 325.8016 are covered by the state
antitrust law."' The definition of "person" indicates that the law
regulates, and may be invoked by, all legal entities including a state
and its political subdivisions.2 ' Finally, the definition assigned to
"contract, combination, or conspiracy" specifically includes all collu-
sive arrangements, regardless of form.'
Consignment transactions, however, appear to be exempted from
treatment as a "contract, combination, or conspiracy."'2 This exclu-
sion is significant. For example, if two manufacturers engage in verti-
cal price fixing"' but one firm distributes through consignment while
the other uses a sale-resale system, the latter may be found in viola-
tion of section 325.8013 while the former will escape liability. Such
an interpretation, however, is contrary to current federal precedent 2 '
and to sound policy, as it places form over substance.25
119. This extremely broad coverage is similar to the federal law's scope. See
generally United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1955).
120. MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(5) (1978). This definition is also taken from § 1(4)
of the Uniform Draft. The attached commentary states, "This is intended to be inclu-
sive of all legal entities." UNIFoRm DRAFt, supra note 46, at § 1(4), Comment.
121. See Mn N. STAT. § 325.8012(4) (1978).
122. Although MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(4) (1978) makes no reference to consign-
ment transactions, that provision is taken directly from § 1(2) of the Uniform Draft.
The comment reads:
This definition is designed to include within the Act all collusive arrange-
ments regardless of form, sale, contract to sell, purchase, contract to pur-
chase, lease, contract to lease, license, contract to license, trust, common
selling or purchasing agent, pool, or holding company. Consignment transac-
tions have not been included; a principal is at liberty to control the price and
other terms upon which his agent may dispose of his commodities or services.
UNIFORM DRAFT, supra note 46, at § 1(2), Comment.
123. Vertical price fixing occurs when a seller and a buyer agree to set the price
at which the buyer may resell the product. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
ANTrrRUST 277 (1977). Such an agreement is illegal under MINN. STAT. § 325.8013
(1978).
124. Section 325.8012(4) was in substantial accord with older federal doctrine.
See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 381 (1967) (vertical terri-
torial and customer restrictions, otherwise per se illegal, not per se illegal in consign-
ment relationship); United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 488 (1926)
(vertical price fixing in consignment relationship not a violation of § 1 of Sherman
Act). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has retreated from the position of
extending special treatment to consignment distribution systems. See Continental
T.V., Inc. V. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977) (consignment and resale
arrangements treated alike under § 1 of the Sherman Act in the case of vertical
territorial restriction); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 18 (1964) (resale price
maintenance in a consignment agreement violates § 1 of Sherman Act).
125. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977);
Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 18 (1964).
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2. Substantive Provisions
The Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971 contains three substantive
provisions.' 5 Section 325.8013'2 establishes a general "rule of reason"
standard of legality for all transactions between two or more per-
sons.'1 Section 325.8015 specifies that certain transactions between
two or more persons are per se illegal.'25 Finally, section 325.8014
prohibits unilateral activities that tend toward monopolization.''
a. Unreasonable Restraints of Trade
Section 325.8013,'1' the "rule of reason" provision, is taken di-
rectly from section 2 of the first tentative draft of the Uniform State
Antitrust Act. 132 The ultimate source of the language, however, is the
basic federal antitrust statute, section 1 of the Sherman Act. in Given
126. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8013-.8015 (1978). These three sections, viewed as
a whole, codify the federal doctrine surrounding §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
There is, however, no provision in the Minnesota Act parallel to §§ 3 and 7 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1976), or § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). These federal statutes were adopted to supplement areas of
economic behavior Congress felt were inadequately covered by the Sherman Act, spe-
cifically tying arrangements, exclusive dealing contracts, and mergers. See L.
SuijVAN, supra note 123, at 432-34. While all such behavior would also be illegal under
the Sherman Act if it caused a large enough restraint of trade, the additional statutes
were designed to stop such conduct at a much earlier stage. Since Minnesota's law is
similar to the Sherman Act but does not include provisions analogous to the Clayton
Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act, tying arrangements, exclusive dealing con-
tracts, and mergers will have to reach the more severe level needed for Sherman Act
notice before they will be considered to be violations of the Minnesota antitrust stat-
ute.
127. MINN. STAT. § 325.8013 (1978) ("A contract, combination, or conspiracy
between two or more persons in unreasonable restraint of trade or commerce is unlaw-
ful.").
128. See text accompanying notes 136-40 infra.
129. See note 146 infra. Per se illegality under the Act is discussed at text accom-
panying notes 146-97 infra.
130. See text accompanying note 198 infra.
131. See note 127 supra.
132. UNIFORM DRAFr, supra note 46, at § 2.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ..... "). The comment to the UNIFORM
DitAFr supra note 46, at § 2 provides:
This section parallels section 1 of the Sherman Act and establishes a general
standard of legality. The word "unreasonable" has been inserted to indicate
that the Rule of Reason is to govern the construction of the Act. The adoption
of the language of the Sherman Act will provide needed flexibility and it will
also make available to state courts the entire body of federal precedent.
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the Sherman Act section 1 precedent, and the likelihood that section
325.8013 will be interpreted in light of such precedent, 34 the broad
outlines of Minnesota's "rule of reason" standard may be sketched.
The threshold requirement for application of section 325.8013 is
that the challenged activity must involve a "contract, combination,
or conspiracy between two or more persons."'35 Federal decisions have
indicated that agreements need not be directly proven but may be
inferred from the behavior of the alleged collaborators. 136 Evidence
that the Minnesota law follows this approach can be found in the
broad definition given to "contract, combination, or conspiracy.' '3 7
The Minnesota Legislature, however, did not make "proof of con-
sciously parallel business behavior" ' circumstantial proof of a com-
bination."' Federal decisions suggest, however, that such evidence
will be circumstantial proof of a combination in situations where it
is unlikely that the consciously parallel behavior resulted from inde-
pendent business decisions. "'
The second requirement imposed by section 325.8013 is that the
agreement or combination unreasonably restrain "trade or com-
merce." Because almost every contract restricts at least one party's
economic behavior,"' trade or commerce will be affected in nearly
every case. "Unreasonable" is the critical term; it indicates that the
judicial concept of "the rule of reason" governs this section.4 2 Unfor-
tunately, the concept of "rule of reason" is not suited to precise
definition.' In general, "rule of reason" implies inquiry into three
134. See text accompanying notes 65-83 supra.
135. MINN. STAT. § 325.8013 (1978).
136. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946);
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
137. MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(4) (1978). See text accompanying note 121 supra.
138. An example of this activity would be identical pricing behavior by compet-
ing firms where each firm realizes the group's uniformity and his role in that uniform-
ity. See American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946).
139. Section 17 of the House counterpart to the bill that became law, H.F. No.
1475, 67th Minn. Legis., 1971 Sess., contained a provision stating, "Proof of con-
sciously parallel business behavior is circumstantial evidence of a prohibited contract,
combination, or conspiracy." The Senate never considered this bill, see [1971] Minn.
Journal of the Senate 4019 (Senate record of House bills), and it died in the House.
See [1971] Minn. Journal of the House 2768-69 (May 11, 1971) (last action by the
House); id. at 4476 (House record of House bills indicating no subsequent proceedings).
140. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540-41 (1954) (mere parallel action of film distributors in uniformly refusing
first-run films to a suburban theatre not proof of conspiracy as business reasons existed
that would allow each distributor to make the decision independently).
141. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1911).
142. See UNIFORM DRAFr, supra note 46, at § 2, Comment.
143. The federal "rule of reason" standard was established in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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interrelated factors: "(1) the effects of the conduct in question, both
in its restraint on competition and in achieving a more efficient mode
of performing desired economic functions, (2) the power of the parties
in the market which they serve, and (3) the motives underlying their
conduct."' An action brought under a "rule of reason" standard thus
entails detailed factual and theoreiical inquiry and analysis.'
b. Per Se Violations
Federal law has long recognized a major exception to the rule of
reason:
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused
or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se unrea-
sonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are pro-
scribed. . . more certain. . . but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into
the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related indus-
tries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint
has been unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.'4'
The concept of per se violation theoretically allows the court to forego
any inquiry into the actual anticompetitive effects of the alleged
violations, the possible counter-balancing pro-competitive effects of
the activity at issue, or the actual, resultant public harm."' Proof of
a certain type of behavior allows the conclusive presumption of an
antitrust violation.'48 Thus, the difference between the "rule of rea-
The merely generic enumeration which the statute makes of the acts to
which it refers and the absence of any definition of restraint of trade as used
in the statute leaves room for but one conclusion, which is, that it was
expressly designed ... to leave it to be determined by the light of reason,
guided by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public
policy embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular
act or contract was within the contemplation of the statute.
Id. at 63-64.
144. H. BLAKE & R. PrrOFsKY, CAsEs & MATERIALS iN ANTITRUST LAW 492 (1967).
145. See Stern, supra note 26, at 728.
It should be noted that most horizontal agreements are governed by the per se
provisions of § 325.8015, the primary application of § 325.8013 will be to vertical
restraints and to mergers. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
146. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
147. See generally L. SuLtivAN, supra note 123, at 182-86, 192-94.
148. See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-
24 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-401 (1927).
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son" and per se standards is "whether the judicial investigation
should consider all possibly relevant facts or whether certain factors
simply may be ignored or presumed to exist.' 4'
Certain activities are expressly declared to be per se illegal under
section 325.8015 of the Minnesota antitrust law. 50 Subdivision one of
the section codifies many of the offenses traditionally given per se
treatment under section 1 of the Sherman Act: horizontal price and
production fixing,' 5' horizontal market allocation,'5 bid rigging,1 3
and collusive refusals to deal.' Subdivision two of section -325.8015
deals with the use of boycotts in a politically or socially discrimina-
tory manner."5
(1) Traditional Per Se Violations
Section 325.8015, subdivision 1(1), codifies three offenses: hori-
zontal price fixing, horizontal production fixing, and horizontal mar-
ket allocation. 5 Inclusion of the language "between two or more
persons in competition" 5 7 indicates that vertical agreements or re-
straints5 ' are excluded from the reach of this subsection.
Subsection (1)(a) codifies the prohibition of one of the earliest
and most widely recognized per se antitrust violations: price fixing
between competitors.'59 The Supreme Court has dealt harshly with
such arrangements, holding that neither the reasonableness of the
resulting price' nor the benefit to the public'' are mitigating factors.
If a horizontal agreement 6 ' results in "interference with the setting
of price by free market force,""' it is illegal price fixing.
Subsection (1)(b) prohibits agreements between competitors to
limit production. Since production fixing is an indirect method of
149. H. BLAKE & R. Prr0FsKY, supra note 144, at 492.
150. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015 (1978).
151. See text accompanying notes 156-64 infra.
152. See text accompanying notes 165-69 infra.
153. See text accompanying notes 170-71 infra.
154. See text accompanying notes 172-87 infra.
155. See text accompanying notes 188-93 infra.
156. MiNN. STAT. 325.8015(1)(1) (1978).
157. Id.
158. The term "vertical" signifies a relationship between a buyer and a seller.
See L. SULuVAN, supra note 123, at 376.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940);
Unites States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396 (1927).
160. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
161. See, e.g., Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597-99 (1936).
162. A horizontal agreement is a combination between competitors. See L.
SuLLiVAN, supra note 123, at 213.
163. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969).
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price control,' 4 this subsection merely details another form of price
fixing.
Subsection (1)(c), in accordance with federal doctrine,," prohib-
its agreements between competitors not to compete with each other
in certain designated product or geographic markets.'" One special
problem with the prohibition of horizontal market allocation agree-
ments arises in connection with covenants not to compete. Covenants
not to compete are commonly used in the sale of an established busi-
ness to ensure that the purchaser's interest in "customer good will"
is not infringed upon by the seller. While covenants not to compete
are clearly a type of market allocation agreement, a reasonable con-
struction of the statue would exempt covenants not to compete from
per se treatment, subjecting them instead to the "rule of reason"
standard. Section 1 of the Sherman Act has been interpreted in sub-
stantial accord with this rule.' 7 Moreover, commentary to the Illinois
antitrust provision that parallels section 325.8015, subdivision 1(1) (c)
of the Minnesota law specifically exempts covenants not to compete
from per se treatment, "' preferring to treat such agreements under
the "rule of reason." Although the Minnesota provision has not been
interpreted by the courts, Minnesota cases, both before and after
1971, indicate that covenants not to compete should receive "rule of
reason" scrutiny."9
164. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377
(1921); Virginia Excelsior Mills v. Federal Trade Commission, 256 F.2d 538, 539 (4th
Cir. 1958).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 354-58 (1967); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1898), affl'd, 175 U.S. 211, 243-44 (1899).
166. See generally L. SuLLvIA, supra note 123, at 213-29.
167. See, e.g., United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153, 178-
81, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
168. The 1967 Bar Committee Comments to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-3
(Smith-Hurd 1977) state,
It seems clear, therefore, that truly ancillary covenants, such as a seller's
reasonably limited agreement not to compete in connection with the sale of
a business, would not be proscribed by the '"per se" provisions of Section 3(1)
relating to allocation of customers or territories. All covenants or restrictions
which are truly ancillary to an otherwise proper business purpose may have
their legality tested under the unreasonable restraint of trade provisions in
Section 3(2) and if found to be truly ancillary and reasonably limited should
be held lawful under that section.
169. See, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533-34, 134
N.W.2d 892, 898-99 (1965); Naftalin v. John Wood Co., 263 Minn. 135, 116 N.W.2d 91
(1962) (by implication). Two cases involving covenants not to compete have been
decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court since 1971. See Bess v. Bothman, 257
N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Minn. 1977); Harris v. Bolin, 310 Minn. 391, 247 N.W.2d 600
(1976). In both these cases, the court relied on a reasonableness test, making no men-
tion of MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(1)(c) (1978).
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Section 325.8015, subdivision 1(2), 110 declares bid rigging to be
per se illegal, essentially defining another type of price fixing. Though
overlapped by subsection 1, subsection 2 serves as an extra warning
of the illegality of this type of price fixing and may serve as notice
that the state will probably emphasize enforcement in this area.,"
This subsection does not require bid rigging agreements to be hori-
zontal. Thus, bid rigging aggreements between bidders and public
officials also appear to be per se illegal.
Section 325.8015, subdivision 1(3), 12 makes agreements to refuse
to deal with a certain person or class of persons per se illegal. This
provision substitutes well-established Sherman Act doctrine7 3 for
170. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(2) (1978) declares the following to be unreasona-
ble and unlawful restraints of trade:
A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons
whereby, in the letting of any public contract, (a) the price quotation of any
bid is fixed or controlled, (b) one or more persons refrains from the submis-
sion of a bid, or (c) competition is in any other manner restrained.
171. The only case involving § 325.8015(1)(2), is Anderson v. Marshall Publish-
ing Co., No. CV78064 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., Nov. 6, 1978), in which all the
newspapers in Lyon County combined to submit a single bid to the Board of County
Commissioners for publication of the county's legal notices. The bid was at the maxi-
mum rate allowed by law. A private citizen brought an action charging that this was
bid rigging in violation of § 325.8015(1)(2). The district court dismissed the action,
relying on Brainerd Dispatch Newspaper Co. v. County of Crow Wing, 196 Minn. 194,
264 N.W. 779 (1936). The Brainerd Dispatch case held that the pre-1971 antitrust law
was not applicable to a fact situation identical to the one at issue in Anderson. The
Anderson court noted that although the antitrust statute had been "amended" since
1936, the rationale of the 1936 decision nevertheless applied. The court further noted
that the "bid rigging" at issue was reasonable because of its complete openness, the
freedom of choice the county had in accepting the single bid, and the fact that this
combination of newspapers would permit a much larger coverage than would a single
newspaper.
The Anderson decision may be strongly criticized. The court in Brainerd Dispatch
decided the case under common law, ruling that the pre-1971 antitrust statute was not
applicable to this form of bid rigging. 196 Minn. at 198, 264 N.W. at 781. Although
such an approach is defensible under the pre-1971 law, which included only a "rule of
reason" provision and did not mention bid rigging, the new antitrust statute specifi-
cally deals with bid rigging, making it per se illegal. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(2)
(1978). The Anderson court's reliance on prior common law was thus erroneous.
The Anderson court, erroneously reading Brainerd Dispatch as interpretive of the
provisions of the pre-1971 statute, compounded this error by determining that Brainerd
Dispatch remained authoritative after passage of the new statute. See notes 59-61
supra and accompanying text. In any event, as noted above, the 1971 statute plainly
states that bid rigging is per se illegal.
172. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(3) (1978) declares as unreasonable restraints of
trade "A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons refusing
to deal with another person, except a refusal to deal by associations, trading boards,
or exchanges when predicated upon a failure to comply with rules of membership."
173. See, e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 210-11
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941).
19791
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
prior Minnesota law that appears to have allowed such combinations
in a line of cases described as "the most numerous, and the least clear
antitrust cases decided under the [pre-1971 Minnesota antitrust]
statute ... ."17
Subsection (3) does not specify that parties to boycott agree-
ments must be "in competition." This omission implies that the
agreements outlawed by the provision include noncommercial boy-
cotts, "'75 as well as vertical boycotts, such as exclusive franchises,'
and exclusive dealing or requirements contracts. 7 This construction
is strengthened by the fact that language exempting such vertical
agreements from per se treatment was deleted from the original
draft' and from a House counterpart to the Senate bill that became
law.' Interpreting the 1971 statute to find exclusive franchises, ex-
clusive dealing arrangements, and requirements contracts per se ille-
gal makes Minnesota law more rigorous than federal antitrust law,
174. French, supra note 7, at 74. See, e.g., Roraback v. Motion Picture Mach.
Operators Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N.W. 766 (1918); Scott-Stafford Opera House Co.
v. Minneapolis Musicians Ass'n, 118 Minn. 410, 136 N.W. 1092 (1912); Ertz v. Produce
Exchange Co., 82 Minn. 173, 84 N.W. 743 (1901); Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn.
223, 55 N.W. 1119 (1893).
175. Accommodation would have to be made if such "boycotts" are sheltered by
the first amendment. Per se treatment of "non-commercial boycotts" would reach
beyond the apparent Supreme Court position. See e.g., Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959).
176. Exclusive franchises are agreements betWeen a manufacturer/producer and
its distributor/dealer/franchisee that the manufacturer will not sell to anyone except
the distributor in a particular area, thus foreclosing or "boycotting" other similar
distributors in the area from that product. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 123,
at 260-61.
177. Exclusive dealing or requirements contracts are agreements between a man-
ufacturer/producer and a purchaser of the manufacturer's goods that the purchaser will
buy all of his needs in that certain product from the manufacturer, thus foreclosing or
"boycotting" other manufacturers of the same product from that purchaser as an
outlet. See L. SULLVAN, supra note 123, at 471.
178. S. Crecelius, supra note 45, at § 5(c). See H.F. No. 1475, Minn. State House,
1971 Sess. § 5. The original draft stated,
[T]he following unreasonably restrain trade or commerce and are unlawful:
... A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more per-
sons refusing to deal with another person, except. . .(b) exclusive dealing
arrangements, or (c) exclusive territorial wholesale distributorships or retail
distributorships. Refusals to deal excepted under this subdivision may be
unlawful under section 3.
S. Crecelius, supra note 45, at § 5.
179. See [1971] Minnesota Journal of the House 2768-69 (May 11, 1971)
(amended in committee, report adopted by House). For a discussion of the legislative
history of the House bill, see note 139, supra.
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which exempts such vertical boycott agreements from per se treat-
ment.'
Subsection (3) does, however, except associations from per se
treatment when their refusal to deal is prompted by the boycotted
person's unwillingness to comply with the association's rules of mem-
bership. 8 ' This exemption is in harmony with federal doctrine. 8 2 As-
sociations may, however, be held to a "rule of reason" test'83 to ensure
their rules of membership are reasonable in light of valid association
goals.'84
Section 325.8015, subdivision 1, as a whole, appears to be an
attempt to codify most"" of the Sherman Act section 1 per se offenses
as they existed in 1971. The specificity of this subdivision, however,
will tend to "freeze" the listed practices as a minimum definition of
the per se standard in Minnesota. 8 Given the United States Su-
preme Court's recent tendency to restrict the range of what was in
1971 considered per se illegal under federal law,8 7 such a "freeze"
may mean that the Minnesota law will be relatively more strict than
federal antitrust doctrine.
(2) Discriminatory Boycotts
Section 325.8015, subdivisions 2 and 3,'1 were added to the Min-
nesota antitrust law in 1977189 in an apparent response to Arab-
induced boycotting of certain Jewish businesses."0 The subdivisions
prohibit exclusion of a business or person from a commercial transac-
tion on the basis of widely recognized categories of discrimination or
because that business or person has done business with a particular
180. See Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 325 (1961)
(requirements contract tested under "rule of reason"); Packard Motor Car Co. v.
Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (exclusive franchise
arrangement tested under "rule of reason").
181. MN. STAT. § 325.8015(1)(3) (1978).
182. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
& Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
183. MINN. STAT. § 325.8013 (1978).
184. See generally Marjorie Webster Jr. College v. Middle States Ass'n. of Col-
leges & Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
185. See text accompanying notes 151-54 supra, and note 195 infra.
186. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 728. That minimum definition is subject to
expansion by § 325.8013. See text accompanying notes 194-97 infra.
187. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-59
(1977).
188. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015(2), (3) (1978).
189. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 173, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 286.
190. Maclin Interview, supra note 7.
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country."' The statute also goes to extensive lengths to make clear
that mere compliance with or acquisence to a demand by another to
participate in such discrimination is per se illegal."2 Given possible
preemption by a similar congressional act,19 the significance of sec-
tion 325.8015, subdivisions 2 and 3, is likely to be slight.
c. The Relationship Between the "Rule of Reason" and "Per Se"
Provisions
As noted, section 325.8015 is essentially a codification of the
various types of activities the federal courts have labeled per se illegal
under section 1 of the Sherman Act."4 Certain activities that have
achieved per se status under Sherman Act section 1, however, are not
included under section 325.8015.195 This raises a question as to
whether these'activities should receive per se or "rule of reason"
treatment under section 325.8013. Inclusion of the language
"[wlithout limiting section 325.8013 . . ."I as a preface to section
325.8015 indicates that behavior not included in section 325.8015 may
still receive per se treatment under section 325.8013.11
A reasonable construction of section 325.8013 is that it is fully
extensive with Sherman Act section 1, establishing the "rule of rea-
son" as the general standard of legality for agreements or combina-
tions that affect trade or commerce. Certain behavior may also be
given per se treatment under section 325.8013 in harmony with cur-
191. MiNN. STAT. § 325.8015(2)(3) (1978).
192. Id.
193. Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, tit. II, 91
Stat. 244 (1977). The Minnesota statute provides for such preemption. MINN. STAT. §
325.8015(2)(4) (1978).
194. See text accompanying notes 151-54 supra.
195. Two important Sherman Act § 1 per se offenses that are not included in §
325.8015 are resale price maintenance, see, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145,
152-54 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29,46-47 (1960), and tying
arrangements. See e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S.
610, 611 (1977); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-
15 (1953).
The absence of resale price maintenance from § 325.8015 may be explained by the
fact that, in 1971, Minnesota still had a fair trade act that allowed vertical price fixing
in some circumstances. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 117, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 186.
Minnesota's fair trade act was repealed last year. Act of Mar. 9, 1978, ch. 473, 1978
Minn. Laws 77.
196. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015 (1978).
197. A counter-argument is that the use of the term "unreasonable" in §
325.8013, a term not found in Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), indicates that
this section is restricted to "rule of reason." This inference is strengthened by the
express enumeration of explicit per se violations in the separate section of the 1971 law,
§ 325.8015.
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rent federal decisions. Section 325.8015 serves only to ensure that its
enumerated activities will always receive per se scrutiny regardless
of federal decisions under the Sherman Act.
d. Monopolization
Section 325.8014 establishes the standard of legality for conduct
tending toward or accomplishing monopolization:
The establishment, maintenance, or use of, or any attempt to estab-
lish, maintain, or use monopoly power over any part of trade or
commerce by any person or persons for the purpose of affecting
competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices is unlaw-
ful."'
The provision finds its immediate source in section 3(a) of the
Uniform Draft.'"I Its ultimate source, however, is section 2 of the
Sherman Act2" and therefore the federal decisions construing section
2 provide the best guide for interpretation."0 '
Under federal interpretation of the Sherman Act, proof of the
offense of monopolization has three elements. First, the relevant mar-
ket must be delineated.2 Second, the defendant must possess mo-
nopoly power in that relevant market.13 Third, there must have been
198. MINN. STAT. § 325.8014 (1978).
199. UNIFoRM DRAFT, supra note 46, at § 3(a), Comment. The commentary pro-
vides,
Subsection (a) establishes a more definite standard of legality for the offense
of monopolization. Monopoly power is of course required, but in place of the
additional federal requirement of "deliberateness" the statute substitutes a
more definite requirement of purpose to exclude competition or control, fix,
or maintain prices. This test, though perhaps narrower than the federal,
should be more easily administered.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976):
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be pun-
ished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any
other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceed-
ing three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
201. See text accompanying notes 65-83 supra.
202. The relevant market is the market in which the product alleged to be mo-
nopolized competes. The market consists of both geographic and product segments.
The relevant geographic market is the "area in which the seller operates, and to which
the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies." Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). The relevant product market is a function of the inter-
changeability of the product at issue and other closely related products. See United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394-95 (1956). Note that the
smaller the defined relevant market, the easier it is to find monopoly power.
203. Monopoly power is "the power to control prices or exclude competition."
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a "deliberateness" in the acquisition or maintenance of that monop-
oly power, commonly referred to as a "general intent" to monopo-
lize." 4 Although section 325.8014 does not explicitly require the delin-
eation of a relevant market and a showing of monopoly power in that
market, application of the doctrine of uniform construction requires
constructive incorporation of both these federal requisites. 05 In place
of the federal deliberateness requirement,06 however, the Minnesota
provision expressly substitutes the more definite and restricted re-
quirement of a "purpose of affecting competition or controlling, fix-
ing, or maintaining prices. 12 7 Section 325.8014 thus appears to estab-
lish a stricter standard of illegality for the offense of monopolization
than does section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The offense of attempted monopolization in Minnesota more
closely parallels the federal law. Under section 2 of the Sherman Act,
an illegal attempt to monopolize is shown by delineation of the rele-
vant market, proof of specific intent to monopolize that relevant
market, and evidence of a dangerous probability of success in such
monopolization. 28 The Minnesota law seems to require proof of the
same three elements.
2 0 9
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). The firm's
percentage share of the relevant market is a useful guide. Although "[ninety] percent
• . .is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four
percent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not." United States v.
Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (1945).
204. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). Proof
of that "deliberateness" or general intent may be shown in three ways. First, proof that
the monopoly power was acquired or maintained by the use of means that if done in
combination with others would constitute a violaiion of Sherman Act § 1 is sufficient.
Second, it is sufficient to show monopoly power plus use of any exclusionary practice
even if it is not technically a restraint of trade. Finally, proof of monopoly power and
a failure by the possessor of that power to show the power was solely obtained or
maintained by legitimate business activity aimed at short-term profit maximization
is sufficient evidence of a "general intent" to monopolize. See United States v. United
Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 Supp. 295, 342 (D.C. Mass. 1953).
205. See text accompanying notes 65-83 supra. See also UNFOm DRArr, supra
note 46, at § 3(a), Comment.
206. See note 204 supra.
207. MirN. STAT. § 325.8014 (1978).
208. Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1348-49 (3rd Cir.
1975).
209. Although § 325.8014 expressly addresses the element of intent, the Minne-
sota statutory definition is similar to the definition of specific intent given by federal
courts in attempted monopolization cases. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S.
375, 396 (1905) (specific intent to monopolize is not merely the general intent to do
the acts complained of, but a specific intent to destroy competition or achieve monop-
oly). In addition, absence of express reference in § 325.8014 to the requirements of a
relevant market and dangerous probability of success in monopolization indicate fed-
eral precedent in these areas should be followed. See text accompanying notes 65-83
supra.
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act also makes it an offense to conspire
to monopolize.2 10 The Act states that it is illegal to "combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize."21 The
Uniform Draft section from which section 325.8014 was taken in-
cludes similar language.2 1 2 This language, however, was not included
in the Minnesota statute, indicating that the legislature did not in-
tend to include an offense of conspiracy to monopolize within section
325.8014.213
3. Exemptions
Traditionally, certain activities have been exempted from fed-
eral antitrust scrutiny on the assumption that noncompetitive behav-
ior in certain segments of the economy is in the public interest.2 1, The
Minnesota statute similarly limits application of its substantive pro-
210. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). No overt act need be shown. See, e.g., Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 378 (1913). See also Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws,
44 Nw. U.L. REv. 743, 757-60 (1950). Note that the offenses of monopolization or
attempted monopolization may be and usually are committed by single entities. See
Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 117, at 498-99.
211. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). See note 200 supra.
212. UNIFORM DRAt, supra note 46, at § 3(b) ("A combination or conspiracy
between two or more persons to establish monopoly power over any part of trade or
commerce is unlawful.").
213. One may argue, however, that the inclusion of the words "by any person or
persons," MINN. STAT. § 325.8014 (1978) (emphasis added), was meant to allow an
action for conspiracy to monopolize. The original draft of the 1971 antitrust bill
followed the Uniform Draft's format of having two subsections within the section on
monopolization. See S. Crecelius, supra note 45, at § 4. The first subsection related to
unilateral conduct and the second dealt with conduct by two or more entities. See note
212 supra. When introduced, however, the bill contained only the first Uniform Draft
subsection and, the phrase "[tihe establishment, maintenance, or use of, monopoly
power over any part of trade or commerce by any person," had been changed to read
"by any person or persons." S.F. No. 1200, § 4, Minn. State Senate, 1971 Sess. This
suggests that the introduction of the words "or persons" was intended to incorporate
the deleted concept of "conspiracy to monopolize."
214. Initial reasons for allowing or encouraging cartelization include a judgment
that competition will not work in a certain area, a policy decision that cartelization
will transfer economic power into a beneficial group, or a decision that cartelization
will facilitate greater stability. It should be noted, however, that exemptions may
continue to exist long after the policy reasons for their creation have disappeared. L.
SuLLiVAN, supra note 123, at 717-19.
The federal exemptions for labor organizations and agricultural cooperatives are
intended to shift power to beneficiary groups and, perhaps, to enhance stability. Id.
at 718. The federal exemptions for governmental actions is predicated on the convic-
tion that direct action by federal or state government that is inconsistent with antitrust
doctrine represents a sovereign decision that the role of competition should, in a partic-
ular instance, be displaced. Id. at 719. A collective bargaining exemption reflects the
national policy of encouraging collective bargaining. Id. at 723.
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visions through exemptions provided by section 325.8017.25 The sec-
tion is divided into three subdivisions: the first excepts "labor, elec-
trical, agricultural, or horticultural organizations;" '2 " the second ex-
empts governmentally regulated activity;2 17 and the third exemption
deals with collective bargaining. 28 The language of these exemptions
is often vague and thus vulnerable to broad interpretation. In light
of the overriding policy of antitrust law of promoting competition, 211'
however, these exemptions should be given strict construction.
210
a. Labor, Agricultural, and Electrical Organizations
Section 325.8017, subdivision 1, exempts the activities of labor,
agricultural, electrical, and horticultural non-profit organizations
"instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not conducted for
profit. '211 The state exemption for labor organizations, taken largely
from section 6 of the Clayton Act, 2 may be superfluous since the
state's authority to regulate labor organizations is already sharply
limited m
215. MiNN. STAT. § 325.8017 (1978).
216. Id. § 325.8017(1).
217. Id. § 325.8017(2).
218. Id. § 325.8017(3).
219. UNIFORM DR n, supra note 46, Prefatory Note.
220. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
221. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(1) (1978):
Nothing contained in sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, shall be construed
to forbid the existence or operation of labor, electrical, agricultural, or horti-
cultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organiztions from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the provisions
of sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, when lawfully carrying out the legitimate
objects thereof.
222. Id. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976), provides, in part,
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the
existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations,
instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or
conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such
organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor
shall such organizations, or the members thereof be held or construed to be
illegal combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws.
The federal antitrust labor exemption is also the product of § 20 of the Clayton
Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976), and of the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-
110, 113-115 (1976).
223. See, e.g., Association of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971);
San Diego Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters
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The state exemption for "agricultural or horticultural organiza-
tions"'2 also finds its source in section 6 of the Clayton Act2 as well
as section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act.ns Under federal law, agricul-
tural cooperatives are allowed the right to jointly process, handle, and
market their products, but do not enjoy immunity when they com-
bine with groups that do not qualify for the agricultural cooperative
exception.22 This interpretation is consistent with the language of
section 325.8017, subdivision 1.2
The Minnesota electrical cooperative exception has no explicit
counterpart in the federal laws. Under federal law, an electrical coop-
erative must seek exemption under the general exception for govern-
mentally regulated activity.Y' As introduced in the legislature, the
Minnesota law also provided no specific electrical cooperative excep-
tion, 10 but electrical cooperatives were added shortly after the bill's
introduction.nI As with other cooperatives, the exemption should not
extend to combinations with groups not exempted by the provision.2
b. Governmental Regulation
Section 325.8017, subdivision 2,2 exempts various types of gov-
ernmentally regulated activity. The vague language of this subsection
appears to create two types of exemptions. The first is for "actions
or arrangements otherwise permitted" by the state. Given the origins
of this section,2 a reasonable conclusion is that this is a shorthand
v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d
1154, 1175 (5th Cir. 1973).
224. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(1) (1978); see note 221 supra.
225. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976); see note 222 supra.
226. 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1976).
227. See, e.g., Case-Swayne Co. v. SunKist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967);
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939). See also Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19 (1962); Maryland & Va. Milk Prods.
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
228. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(1) (1978); see note 221 supra.
229. See Dunne, Oregon's "Little Sherman Act," 56 OR. L. Rxv. 331, 341 (1977).
230. S.F. 1200, Minn. State Senate, 1971 Sess. Activity by electrical cooperatives
would have probably still been exempted under § 325.8017(2) as "actions ... other-
wise permitted ... under the statutory authority of this state," MnN. STAT. §
325.8017(2) (1978), since electrical cooperatives are specifically allowed by MiNN. STAT.
§ 308.05.
231. [1971] Minnesota Journal of the Senate 2355 (May 7, 1971).
232. See note 227 supra and accompanying text.
233. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(2) (1978) ("Nothing contained in sections 325.8011
to 325.8028, shall apply to actions or arrangements otherwise permitted, or regulated
by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the
United States.").
234. UNIFORM DRAFr, supra note 46, at § 6(b). Titled "Exemption of... Certain
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alternative to listing the specific statutes authorizing industry prac-
tices that might otherwise conflict with the 1971 antitrust law. The
second exemption in subsection 2 is for "actions or arrangements...
regulated by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory
authority of this state or the United States." Federal precedent in
this area makes clear that an express statutory exemption in the law
creating a regulatory body26 activates this exemption. Beyond these
obvious cases, however, the courts take a case by case approach. Key
factors in allowing exemption include the pervasiveness of the regula-
tory framework, the degree of industry noninvolvement in the initial
decisionmaking, and the extent to which the agency considers anti-
trust implications within its decisional process.n?
Specially Regulated Industries," § 6(b) allowed the states to choose between two
alternatives.
ALTERNATE 1
[(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to forbid actions
or arrangements authorized or regulated under [here should follow the acts
authorizing or regulating actions, or arrangements in particular industries,
for example in the sponge, milk, tobacco, alcohol, fishing, oil, insurance, or
banking industries].]
ALTERNATE 2
[(b) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to actions or arrange-
ments otherwise permitted, or regulated by any regulatory body or officer
acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.]
Id. (brackets in original). The second alternative provides legislators with a way to
avoid listing specific "acts authorizing . . . actions or arrangements in particular
industries." Id. (Alternate 1). The 1971 law follows the second alternative. See MINN.
STAT. § 325.8017(2) (1978).
235. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(2) (1978).
236. See, for example, the Federal Aviation Act:
Any person affected by any order made under sections 1378, 1379, or 1382 of
this title shall be, and is hereby, relieved from the operations of the
"antitrust laws," as designated in section 12 of title 15, and of all other
restraints or prohibitions made by, or imposed, under authority of law, inso-
far as may be necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized,
approved, or required by such order.
49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1976), as amended by Act of Oct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, §
30(a), 92 Stat. 1731, and the Federal Communications Act:
If the Commission finds that the proposed consolidation, acquisition, or
control will be of advantage to the persons to whom service is to be rendered
and in the public interest, it shall certify to that effect; and thereupon any
Act or Acts of Congress making the proposed transaction unlawful shall not
apply.
47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1976).
237. See, e.g., City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389
(1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); United
States v. Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy, [1978-1] Trade Cases 62,039 (W.D.
Tex. 1978).
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c. Collective Bargaining
Section 325.8017, subdivision 3,238 like subdivision 1, relates to
labor. Subdivision three, however, focuses solely on the collective
bargaining process, exempting from antitrust scrutiny all agreements
among employers or labor unions made during involvement in collec-
tive bargaining. The subdivision ensures that management and labor
can temporarily combine with other management or labor units to
bargain collectively concerning terms and conditions of employment
throughout an industry, without fear of violating the antitrust law.2 9
4. Civil Remedies
The Minnesota antitrust law provides three non-exclusive alter-
native civil remedies: civil penalties; 20 equitable relief;24' and treble
damages. 24 2
The civil penalty provisions allow the state to enforce its anti-
trust law while avoiding the disadvantages of a criminal prosecution.
Less stigma attaches to civil conviction, 243 the burden of proof is
lower, and the state may appeal adverse trial court decisions.244 In
addition, unlike the case in treble damage actions, the civil penalty
provisions permit the state to proceed in the absence of provable
monetary damages.
Three provisions of the 1971 Minnesota antitrust law relate to
civil penalties. Under Section 325.8018, subdivision 1,245 the Attorney
238. MINN. STAT. § 325.8017(3) (1978) ("Nothing in sections 325.8011 to 325.8028,
shall apply to agreements among employers or agreements among labor unions made
for the purpose of furthering the position of any of the agreeing employers or agreeing
unions in the course of the collective bargaining process.").
239. This exemption conforms with the National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372,
49 Stat. 499 (1935), as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-187 (1976), which established a national policy favoring collective bargaining.
See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 123, at 723; see e.g., Mackey v. Nat'l Football League,
543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1978); Alexander v. Nat'l
Football League, [1977-2] Trade Cases 61,730 (D. Minn. 1977).
240. MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8018(1), .8022, .8023 (1978).
241. Id. § 325.8020.
242. Id. § 325.8019.
243. While the stigma attached to criminal conviction may be a significant deter-
rent for a businessman contemplating the violation of a widely recognized antitrust
provision (such as those listed as per se offenses in § 325.8015(1)), that stigma loses
deterrent value in the more ambiguous area of non-per se offenses, where the civil
penalty is more widely used. Moreover, when the Attorney General is unconvinced that
an offender knew he was acting outside the bounds of legitimate business practices,
the sole option of bringing a criminal action with its attached stigma might deter the
Attorney General from bringing any action at all.
244. Stern, supra note 26, at 743-44.
245. MINN. STAT. § 325.8018(1) (1978) provides,
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General may bring a civil action for the imposition of monetary pen-
alties for violation of any substantive section of the 1971 law"' as well
as for violation of final decrees of judgments.24
Section 325.80222 s permits a court to order the suspension or
forfeiture of a firm's charter and rights to do business within the state
for failure to comply with the terms of consent decrees249 and final
judgments. Courts have wide discretion in setting the terms of a
suspension or forfeiture.ns Wise policy dictates sparing use of such
Any person who is found to have violated section 325.8011 to 325.8028, shall
be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $50,000. Any person who fails
to comply with a final judgment or decree rendered by a court of this state
issued for a violation of sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, shall be subject to a
civil penalty of not more than $100,000.
The subdivision is a much condensed version of UNIFORM DRAr, supra note 46, at §
11, with substantially higher maximum penalties. The commentary to § 11 of the
Uniform Draft provides,
This section fixes civil penalties for violation of the Act, or an injunctive
order or consent decree based on the Act. A civil rather than the traditional
criminal penalty was adopted because it eliminates the disadvantages at-
tendant criminal prosecutions. The stigma tied to criminal conviction, the
strict criminal burden of proof, and the impediment to state appeal from
adverse decisions in trial courts are all removed by this change in the nature
of the penalty.
UNIFORM DRAr, supra note 46, at § 11, Comment.
246. MINN. STAT. 99 325.8013-.8015 (1978).
247. An action for civil penalties is not available against "an individual who fails
to comply with. . . a consent settlement approved by a court of this state concerning
an alleged violation of this act." Language allowing such a penalty, included both in
the UNIFORM DHAr, supra note 46, at § 11, and the initial Antitrust Division draft of
the 1971 law, S. Crecelius, supra note 45, at § 13, was deleted before the bill was
introduced. Section 325.8018(1) is also not applicable to violators of assurances of
discontinuance. See S.F. 918, Minn. State Senate, 1975 Sess. (the bill, which would
have established a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for failure to comply with
assurances of discontinuance, was not passed). An action for contempt of court, how-
ever, is available for failure to comply with a consent decree or assurance of discontinu-
ance. Moreover, if the violation of the assurance of discontinuance or consent decree
is also a violation of the antitrust law, a new action may be brought.
248. MINN. STAT. § 325.8022 (1978).
249. Failure to comply with a consent decree is a violation unreachable by civil
penalty. See note 247 supra.
250. Assuming a request by the Attorney General for the maximum sanction
allowed by § 325.8022, the options available for a court are to either
(1) do nothing;
(2) suspend a limited number of privileges (applicable to either a domestic
or foreign corporation);
(3) suspend all privileges (applicable to either a domestic or a foreign corpo-
ration); -
(4) revoke a limited number of privileges (applicable to either a domestic or
a foreign corporation);
(5) order the forfeiture of the privilege of a foreign corporation to do business
in Minnesota; "'
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sanctions. Suspension or forfeiture partly or totally eliminates a com-
petitor from the market, thus frustrating the fundamental goal of
antitrust law. Such sanctions are also likely to have more severe
economic and social consequences for those innocent state citizens
connected with the sanctioned businessni than would be the case if
fines were imposed or officers were imprisoned.
Section 32 5 .8 02 3 12 provides that while a corporation is responsi-
ble for the acts of its employees, the employees themselves remain
individually liable for knowingly 3 contributing to the commission of
(6) order the forfeiture of the charter rights and privileges of a domestic
corporation; or
(7) order the dissolution of a domestic corporation.
See MINN. STAT. § 325.8022(1) (1978).
Section 325.8022(2) is designed to prevent the "person" who has forfeited the right
to do business within the state from circumventing the forfeiture decree by doing
businss under another name. See id. § 325.8022(2). The Comments to §§ 8-10 of the
Uniform Draft-the model for § 325.8022(2) (1978)-provide, "This section is intended
to prevent the person who has forfeited its right to do business, and, if not a natural
person, its officers, members, or agent, from circumventing the forfeiture decree by
doing business in the state under another name." UmiiORM DRAFr, supra note 46, at
§ 10, Comment.
251. Those who would suffer a hardship, as innocent state citizens connected to
a business sanctioned by forfeiture, may include employees who lose their jobs and
members of the community who depend on the business as a tax resource and as an
incentive for community growth.
252. MINN. STAT. § 325.8023 (1978). The provision is taken directly from the
UNIFORM DRAFt, supra note 46, at §§ 12-13. The Comment to § 12 of the Uniform
Draft-the model for § 325.8023(1)-provides, "This section imposes liability on a
business entity for the acts of its agents acting within the scope of their authority.
Proof of the acts of the agent is prima facie proof of the acts of the business entity."
UNIFORM DRAr supra note 46, at § 12, Comment. The Comment to § 13 of the Uniform
Draft-from which § 325.8023(2) is derived-states,
Any individual who authorized[,] ordered, did, or participated in, or
aided, abetted, or advised in the commission of any of the acts constituting
a violation by a business entity is liable as an individual under sections 11
and 14. Individuals are liable whether or not they acted for their own benefit
or on behalf of the corporation. In any proceeding against the corporation
under sections 11 or 14, these individuals, if subject to personal jurisdiction,
must be joined with their business entity as parties defendant. The purpose
of this compulsory joinder requirement was to give greater force to the impo-
sition of liability on corporate, association, firm, or partnership officers.
253. "Knowingly" was not included in the UNIoRM DRAFT, supra note 46, at §
13, or the bill as introduced, S.F. No. 1200, Minn. State Senate, 1971 Sess., but was
added by amendment. [1971] Minnesota Journal of the Senate 2356 (May 7, 1971).
"Knowingly" seems to require at least that the employee be aware to a substantial
certainty that his conduct will cause the act that constitutes the crime. It is possible
that the legislature intended "knowingly" to incorporate the general standard for
criminal intent, a subjective intent to do the act constituting the crime. As to criminal
intent, see State v. Everson, 286 Minn. 246, 248, 175 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1970). Use of
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an antitrust violation.24
The 1971 antitrust law also enables the state or private parties
to invoke the equity power of the courts to restrain continuing viola-
tions of the Minnesota antitrust statute2 5 Such relief may be granted
by temporary, interlocutory, or permanent injunction. Unlike an ac-
tion for damages,26 however, private parties seeking solely injunctive
relief under the 1971 antitrust law are not entitled to reasonable
attorney fees.
Finally, the Minnesota statute provides for treble damages. Sec-
tion 325.8019,21 which is modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act, "
permits any legal entity 9 to bring an action for injury caused by a
violation of the Minnesota antitrust law. Success results in an auto-
matic trebling of all damages awarded and recovery of all costs and
reasonable attorney fees. The trebling of damages and reimburse-
ment of attorney fees operates as a punitive measure against the
violator 20 and provides encouragement for private plaintiffs to bring
what usually become costly and time-consuming lawsuits. 2 '
the term "willfully" in § 325.8018(2), however, tends to indicate that "knowingly" is
something less than general criminal intent. See text accompanying notes 263-67 infra.
254. Section 325.8023 follows the long standing case law principle that both the
master and servant are jointly liable for tortious acts of the servant that are within
the scope of the servant's employment. See, e.g., Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 331-
32, 233 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1975).
255. MiNN. STAT. § 325.8020 (1978).
256. See text accompanying notes 257-61 infra.
257. MINN. STAT. § 325.8019 (1978) ("Any person, any governmental body, or the
state of Minnesota or any of its subdivisions or agencies, injured by a violation of
sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, shall recover three times the actual damages sustained,
together with costs and disbursements, including reasonable attorneys' fees.").
258. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides,
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district
court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or
is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and
shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable atirney's fee.
259. The reference in § 325.8019 to "person, any governmental body, or the state
of Minnesota or any of its subdivisions or agencies" appears redundant given the §
325.8012(5) definition of "person" as including all those entities listed. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 325.8012(5), .8019 (1978). It may be that such language was intended to make it
clear that the state is entitled to maintain actions for treble damages.
260. Such punitive measures may be justified by the overriding concern for the
operation of the economy and by the tendency of actual damages to be an insufficient
deterrent in cases in which the offensive business practices are especially profitable.
261. Minnesota seems to emphasize this second function with its provision for
mandatory trebling. Minnesota's statute departs from its model, the Uniform Draft,
which provides for a discretionary "increase [in] damages to an amount not in excess
of three times the actual damages sustained." UNIFORM DRAFr, supra note 46, at §
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5. Criminal Sanctions
Criminal sanctions for antitrust violations are available only for
willful violation of per se offenses." 2 While "willful" is not used else-
where in the Minnesota criminal code," 3 and does not appear in fed-
eral antitrust legislation,2" the term is found in the Illinois provision
for criminal prosecution of per se antitrust offenses.265 Commentary
to the Illinois section provides
Under the statute, criminal actions lie only against those who will-
fully enter into a conspiracy to do the prohibited acts. This does not
require proof that a person intentionally joined in activity he knew
to be a violation of section 3(1). It does require a showing that the
person had knowledge that he was engaging in the challenged con-
duct, e.g., price fixing.286
Such a construction is in accord with Minnesota's general definition
of criminal intent.
267
6. Enforcement Authority
Section 325.8021268 places primary responsibility for enforcing the
16(a). Such a discretionary provision may allow the court to set the amount of punitive
damages in accordance with the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence.
It would, however, provide less incentive to a potential plaintiff considering a private
antitrust action, since treble damages would not be assured upon success.
262. MINN. STAT. § 325.8018(2) (1978) provides, "Any person who is found to
have willfully committed any of the acts enumerated in section 325.8015 shall be guilty
of a felony and subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 or imprisonment in the state
penitentiary for not more than five years, or both."
263. MiNN. STAT. §§ 609.01-.85 (1978).
264. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7; 12-27; 41-58 (19761. But see United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978). The Court held that intent is an
element of a criminal antitrust offense. Intent exists when the defendant has carefully
planned and calculated his conduct and understands the consequences of that con-
duct. The Court noted, however, that the business behavior involved in antitrust
charges is usually planned and calculated conduct because it normally would be under-
taken only after weighing the costs, benefits, and risks.
265. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-6 (Smith-Hurd 1977) ("Every person who shall
wilfully do any of the acts prohibited by subsections (1) and (4) of Section 3 of this
Act [listing of per se offenses] commits a . . . felony and a fine shall be imposed not
to exceed $50,000.").
266. Id., Bar Committee Comment.
267. See State v. Everson, 286 Minn. 246, 175 N.W.2d 503 (1970); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.02 (1978).
268. MINN. STAT. § 325.8021 (1978). The provision is a modified version of the
Uniform Draft:
SECTION 7. [Enforcement Authorities.] The attorney general or the
[district attorney of the appropriate county], with the permission or at the
direction of the attorney general, shall investigate suspected violations of,
and institute proceedings for violation of, the provisions of this Act. The
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state antitrust law on the Attorney General. The Attorney General
also derives antitrust enforcement authority from the statutory defi-
nition of the Attorney General's general enforcement powers.26 In
several respects, the general section overlaps and duplicates the grant
of authority in the 1971 antitrust act. In addition, however, the gen-
eral grant of enforcement powers includes specific grants of authority
not included in the 1971 act, yet essential to effective antitrust en-
forcement.
Most significantly, section 325.907, the general enforcement pro-
vision, provides the Attorney General with full discovery power prior
to the commencement of an action. 5 The Attorney General may not
initiate investigative action, however, until he has "reasonable cause
to believe that a violation is imminent, is occurring, or has oc-
curred." ' The "reasonable cause" standard was discussed in the
recent Minnesota district court decision, In re Civil Investigative
Demand Served upon Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co."2 In that case,
Schlitz refused to produce documents requested pursuant to section
325.907, subdivision 2. On motion by the state to compel production,
Schlitz argued that the scope of the state's inquiries exceeded "the
probable cause" for belief that an antitrust violation had occurred.
attorney general may request the [district attorney of the county in which
any proceedings may be brought] to aid and assist in the conduct of any
proceedings brought for violations of this Act.
Comment
This section places primary enforcement responsibility on the attorney
general. Secondary responsibility is lodged with district or county attorneys.
Because of their responsibility for and knowledge of local conditions, and
because of the limitations of the attorney general's enforcement resources,
it is believed that the local government attorneys should assume secondary
responsibility. Absolute control over enforcement measures, however, rests
with the attorney general so that a coordinated and uniform antitrust en-
forcement policy may be maintained.
UNIFORM DRAFt, supra note 46, at § 7 & Comment (emphasis and brackets in original).
269. MN. STAT. § 325.907 (1978). MN. STAT. § 325.8021 (1978) incorporates
MINN. STAT. § 325.907 (1978) into the Minnesota Antitrust Act of 1971: "The investiga-
tory authority of the attorney general under sections 325.8011 to 325.8028 shall include,
but not be limited to, the authority provided for in section 325.907."
270. MINN. STAT. § 325.907(2) (a) (1978). These investigative powers are as exten-
sive as the "civil investigation demand" powers available to the federal enforcement
agencies. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976). Accord, Maclin Interview, supra note 7.
Section 325.907(2)(b) also grants the Attorney General the enforcement option of
"assurances of discontinuance," a remedy not included in the 1971 antitrust act. For
more extensive discussion of the Attorney General's enforcement power, see notes 311-
37 infra and accompanying text.
271. This language is found in both MwN. STAT. § 325.8021 (1978) and §
325.907(2) (1978).
272. No. 734207 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Apr. 4, 1977) (memorandum
and order).
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The court rejected the argument, focusing on the "broad grant of
investigative authority" inherent in the words "any person has vio-
lated . . . any of the laws enumerated in subdivision 1" and
"discovery from any person."' 3 The federal courts have adopted an
equally liberal construction of a parallel federal provision.24 Thus,
while no precise definition of "reasonable cause" under section
325.907 exists, the trend is toward allowing proof of such "cause" to
be of a very general nature.
Section 325.8025 complements the Attorney General's informa-
tion gathering powers by requiring that the Attorney General be given
notice of the commencement of all private antitrust actions.
275
7. Collateral Estoppel
Section 325.802421 governs the subsequent use of decisions in
state antitrust actions. Under this section a private plaintiff may use
a prior judgment2 of antitrust violation as "prima facie" evidence2s
273. In re Civil Investigative Demand Served upon Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., No.
734207 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Apr. 4, 1977) (memorandum and order)
(emphasis by the court). The State argued, with apparent success, that an affidavit
of a Special Assistant Attorney General stating that "the Attorney General, from
information in his possession, has reasonable ground to believe" that violation of the
state antitrust law has occurred is sufficient proof of "reasonable cause." Memoran-
dum in Support of the State of Minnesota Motion to Compel Production of Docu-
ments, at 3-4, In re Civil Investigative Demand Served upon Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
No. 734207 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Apr. 4, 1977).
274. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1311-1314 (1976). See, e.g.,
Petition of Gold Bond Stamp Company, 221 F. Supp. 391, 396-97 (D. Minn. 1963),
aff'd per curiam, 325 F.2d 1018 (8th Cir. 1964).
275. MnN. STAT. § 325.8025 (1978). The section is identical to § 18 of the
Uniform Draft, the comment to which reads,
It is appropriate that the attorney general, the chief public officer
charged with the duty of enforcement of this act, receive notice of actions
by private parties. In this way, the attorney general will receive notice of
alleged violations of this Act that might never otherwise come to his atten-
tion. Cf. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 340.
UNIFORM DRAFT, supra note 46, at § 18, Comment.
276. MINN. STAT. § 325.8024 (1978). This section is taken from § 17 of the
Uniform Draft, the comment to which reads, "The purpose of this section is to aid
private litigants in suits for damages under this Act." UNIFORM DRAmT, supra note 46,
§ 17, Comment. A second probable effect of the inclusion of this provision in the state
antitrust law is that defendants in state actions are more likely to try to avoid an
unfavorable "final judgment or decree," either by early settlement, assurance of dis-
continuance, consent decree, or just fighting harder at trial.
277. Section 325.8024 applies only to "a final judgment or decree" in an action
brought by the state. The section cannot be activated by a private action, consent
decree, or assurance of discontinuance under the state law nor is it applicable to any
government or private proceeding under the federal antitrust laws. The section does
not apply to a subsequent state action. The doctrine of res judicata, however, would
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of antitrust violation in his suit, g provided that the final judgment
would have res judicata effect in a subsequent suit between the state
and the defendant.
The federal counterpart to section 325.8024 is section 5(a) of the
Clayton Act.2° The federal provision gives similar prima facie effect,
in later private suits against the same defendant, to criminal guilty
pleas, criminal convictions, and adverse judgments rendered in
government-sponsored civil injunction actions."' No prima facie ef-
fect is granted, however, to decisions in earlier government damage
suits. 2 2 The apparent inclusion of state-initiated damage actions
within the section 325.8024 language "any civil or criminal proceed-
ing . . . brought by or on behalf of the state of Minnesota" would
thus make the Minnesota provision broader than the analogous
federal law.
8. Statute of Limitations and Venue
Section 325.8026, subdivision 1,2 provides a four-year statute of
limitations for all criminal and civil actions brought under the state
antitrust law.24 Subdivision 2, however, suspends the running of the
apply in such later state action. See generally Howe v. Nelson, 271 Minn. 296, 135
N.W.2d 687 (1965).
278. By giving prima facie instead of estoppel effect to these previous decisions,
the defendant is still able to introduce rebuttal evidence.
279. Without this provision, issues actually litigated and determined in the state
action might have collateral estoppel effect against the state action defendant in a later
private action. The focus of the collateral estoppel doctrine is what issues were actually
litigated and determined. See Wolfson v. Northern States Management Co., 221 Minn.
474, 22 N.W.2d 545 (1946). Section 325.8024 provides that all matters that are res
judicata between the state and the defendant will have "prima facie" effect against
that defendant in a later private action on the same violation. Since the doctrine of
res judicata applies to issues that have or might have been litigated in that state
action, see Howe v. Nelson, 271 Minn. 296, 135 N.W.2d 687 (1965), § 325.8024 has
greater preclusive effect than the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
280. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
281. Dunne, supra note 229, at 350.
282. Id.
283. MwN. STAT. § 325.8026(1) (1978) provides,
An action under sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, shall be forever barred
unless commenced within four years of the date upon which the cause of
action arose. No cause of action barred under existing law on June 8, 1971
shall be revived by sections 325.8011 to 325.8028. For the purpose of this
section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to arise at any
time during the period of violation.
284. It is generally held that a statute of limitations is tolled by fraudulent
concealment on the part of the defendant. See Bond v. Johnson, 270 Minn. 179, 132
N.W.2d 744 (1965). Moreover, a fraudulent concealment doctrine has been applied to
15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (1976), the federal statute of limitations applicable to treble.damage
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statute of limitations while a state action is pending, thereby ena-
bling private litigants to wait to file until after the state judgment is
complete."' Protected from the statute of limitations by this tolling
provision, private litigants can, upon return of a judgment against
the defendant in the state action, assert such judgment as "prima
facie evidence" against the defendant in any private action under
section 325.8024.28 Subdivision 1, identical to a provision in the
Uniform Draft,217 is also in substantial agreement with section 4(b)
and 5(b) of the Clayton Act.m
antitrust suits. See General Elec. Co. v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir.
1964). There is no indication that § 325.8026 was drafted to exclude the application of
this doctrine.
285. MINN. STAT. § 325.8026(2) (1978).
286. Section 325.8026(2) provides,
If any proceeding is commenced under sections 325.8011 to 325.8028, by
the attorney general on behalf of the state of Minnesota, its departments or
agencies, or its political subdivisions, the running of the statute of limita-
tions in respect of every right of action arising under sections 325.8011 to
325.8028, and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in the
aforementioned proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof
and for one year thereafter. If the running of the statute of limitations is
suspended, the action shall be forever barred unless commenced within the
greater of either the period of suspension or four years after the date upon
which the cause of action arose.
Id. (emphasis added). Given that the purpose of the tolling is "so that the private
litigant is not prejudiced by awaiting the'entry of the final decree in the public action
before commencing suit," UNwoRm DRAFT, supra note 46, at § 20, Comment, the phrase
italicized above should be interpreted in light of MINN. STAT. § 325.8024 (1978), the
"prima facie" evidence provision. Reference to § 325.8024 suggests that if a matter in
the intended private suit is also a matter involved in the state brought claim, a
collateral estoppel could be worked by a private litigant using the state judgment as
"prima facie" evidence provision. Reference to § 325.8024 suggests that if a private
litigant can use a state judgment as "prima facie evidence" against the defendant, the
private litigant's right of action is "based in whole or in part" on that state judgment.
This construction would allow application of the ample state precedent of res judicata
to settle the issue of when the statute of limitations is tolled.
287. UNFoRM DRAn, supra note 46, at § 19, Comment, states, "This section
established uniformity with the federal law regarding the statute of limitation." See
id. at § 20, Comment (the model for § 325.8026(2)):
Under section 17 decrees entered against a defendant in an action by the
attorney general for civil penalties or forfeiture are prima facie evidence of a
violation of the Act and may be subsequently used by private parties in
damage actions under section 16. This section tolls the statute of limitations
during the pendency of the public action so that the private litigant is not
prejudiced by awaiting the entry of the final decree in the public action
before commencing suit.
288. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(b), 16(i) (1976). The federal provisions differ from the
Minnesota law in their use of a five-year statute of limitations on criminal actions. See
18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1976).
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As provided in section 32 5 .8 02 7 ,2s state and private antitrust
actions under the 1971 law may be brought in district court in the
county in which the offense was committed, any defendant or his
agent "resides or is found," or where any defendant does business.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW
Minnesota is among the most aggressive states in antitrust en-
forcement."' Its total enforcement budgetl' for fiscal year 1978 was
the twelfth largest nationwide, greater than many states with larger
areas and populations.2 2 Since 1971, the state has filed sixteen ac-
tions under the state antitrust laws, eight within the last two years.
They have ranged over such varied business areas as mobile homes,2 '
office furniture,2 1 liquor wholesaling,21" beauty supplies,2" cosmetol-
ogy,2 17 shopping center leases, 211 oil refining,2"1 sugar refining,3 " fine
paper production, 0 ' and construction. 12 The cases have resulted in
289. MINN. STAT. § 325.8027 (1978).
290. Maclin Interview, supra note 7.
291. The budget consists of both state and federal funding directed toward en-
forcement efforts.
292. In a survey of all 50 states (based on data from the National Association of
Attorneys General), Minnesota was listed as having a total fiscal year 1978 antitrust
enforcement budget of $316,839. States with budgets exceeding that sum were Califor-
nia, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, New
York, and Oregon. In terms of purely state appropriations, Minnesota ranked fifth,
exceeded only by California, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin. Miles Address, supra
note 4, app. 1.
293. See, e.g., State v. Carlsberg Resources Corp., No. 388428 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Ramsey Cty., Dec. 16, 1975); State v. Tomahawk, Inc., No. 40249 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Stearns Cty., June 16, 1975); State v. Olson, No. 42683 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Washington
Cty., Dec. 14, 1972).
294. See State v. Modem Partitions, Inc., No. 716767 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin
Cty., July 17, 1976).
295. See In re Griggs, Cooper & Co., Inc., No. 413432 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey
Cty., July 19, 1976).
296. See State v. National Beauty Supply Co., [1977-1] Trade Cases 61,471
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., June 9, 1977).
297. See In re Northern Minn. Hairdressers Ass'n, 11977-2] Trade Cases
61,542 (Minn. Dist. Ct., St. Louis Cty., July 5, 1977).
298. See In re Minnesota G. R. Kinney Co., Inc., No. 428207 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Ramsey Cty., June 10, 1978).
299. See State v. Koch Refining Co., No. 4-78 Civ. 135 (D. Minn., filed Mar. 31,
1978) (pendant jurisdiction).
300. See State v. Great Western Sugar Co., No. 475 Civ. 135 (D. Minn., filed
Mar. 31, 1975) (pendant jurisdiction).
301. See State v. Boise Cascade Corp., No. 78-1051 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 19,1978)
(pendant jurisdiction).
302. See State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-2] Trade Cases 61,983 (Minn.
Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., May 25, 1978).
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six consent decrees,1 3 three assurances of discontinuance, 34 one civil
judgment,35 and one criminal judgment °6 Through these actions, the
state recovered over $50,000. 307
A. OW-ECTIVES OF ENFORCEMENT
Given ultimately limited resources, the Minnesota Antitrust
Division is continually forced to decide which areas require enforce-
ment attention. The state has, accordingly, tended to focus on re-
gional and local conspiracies and markets. Within these geographical
limitations, efficient use of Minnesota's Antitrust Division resources
is enhanced in a number of ways. State enforcement officials gener-
ally refrain from breaking "new ground," at least in terms of federal
precedent. Within the area of well established federal precedent,
moreover, emphasis is placed on the per se violations listed in sectiorn
325.8015, since these offenses were specifically emphasized by the
legislature, are generally easier to prove, and usually involve the
worst offenders. Priority is given to the individual per se violations
that have caused or are causing the greatest injury to the public.3 8
In addition to following these general guidelines in the investiga-
tion and litigation of possible state antitrust violations, the Antitrust
Division has taken on an educational role. It has urged state regula-
303. See, e.g., State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-2] Trade Cases 62,052
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., May 25, 1978); State v. Schott Brothers, Inc., No. 411390
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Cty., Apr. 21, 1976); State v. Modem Partition, Inc., No.
716767 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., July 17, 1976); State v. Carlsberg Resources
Corp., No. 388428 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Cty., Dec. 16, 1975); State v. Tomahawk,
Inc., No. 40249 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Stearns Cty., June 16, 1975); State v. Olson, No.
42683 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Washington Cty., Dec. 14, 1972).
304. See, e.g., In re Minnesota G.R. Kinney Co., Inc., No. 428207 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., Ramsey Cty., June 10, 1978); In re Northern Minnesota Hairdressers Ass'n, [1977-
2] Trade Cases T 61,542 (Minn. Dist. Ct., St. Louis Cty., July 5, 1977); In re Griggs,
Cooper & Co., Inc., No. 413432, (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Cty., July 19, 1966).
305. See State v. National Beauty Supply Co., [1977-1] Trade Cases 61,471
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., June 6, 1977).
306. See State v. Robert L. Carr Co., No. 1920 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., Mar.
25, 1978) (arraignment and sentence) (penalty of $10,000 for conspiracy to fix price
quotation of a bid in violation of MINN. STAT. § 325.8012(2)(a)).
307. See Minnesota Attorney General's Antitrust Division, supra note 21, at 2.
308. While there is no express listing of the type of violations that the Minnesota
Antitrust Division emphasizes in enforcement, the guidelines just discussed seem to
be generally followed in the Division's enforcement activity. See Rockenstein, Anti-
trust Enforcement: The Attorney General of.Minnesota, in MINNESOTA CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, AN INTRODUCTION To ANTrrRusT LAw AND PRACTICE 155, 158-59 (1972);
Maclin Interview, supra note 7; See also Address by Alan H. Maclin, Special Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Minnesota, before the Antitrust Section of the Min-
nesota State Bar Association 2 (Dec. 13, 1978) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
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tory agencies to stop certain activities that may tend to decrease
competition."' Most recently, the Division has begun to educate the
public in order to decrease the number of inadvertant antitrust viola-
tions and increase the reporting of antitrust violations."'
B. THE PROCESS OF ENFORCEMENT
1. Investigative Functions
Information regarding possible antitrust violations may come
from within the Antitrust Division, from citizens and business com-
plaints, through public purchasing officials' reports of bidding irregu-
larities, through referral from the Antitrust Division of the United
States Justice Department and the Bureau of Competition of the
FTC, and from communications with other states.31 '
If investigation is warranted,3 12 the Division usually proceeds
under the state civil investigative demand provision313 to obtain the
necessary relevant information."' Failure to comply with a request for
information may be countered by an application to district court.3 '
309. For example, minimum fee schedules for cosmetology services were recently
abolished at the urging of the Antitrust Division. See generally 2 State Register 1037
(1977) (deletion of MSBC 64 which set a scale of minimum prices). The Division has
filed similar comments with the Minnesota State Board of Accountancy and the Min-
nesota State Board of Dentistry. Response is pending. See Minnesota Attorney Gen-
eral's Antitrust Division, Attachment to S.F. 424, Application of Minnesota, Section
IV: Remarks, at 2 (Nov. 1, 1978) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review).
310. Id. Such efforts include meetings with and addresses to state purchasing
agents, businessmen, and attorneys. The education campaign also encompasses distri-
bution of publications printed by the Division. See, e.g., Minnesota Attorney General's
Antitrust Division, Antitrust Enforcement in Minnesota: A Guide for Business, Pur-
chasing Agents & Consumers (Sept. 1978) (unpublished memorandum); Minnesota
Attorney General's Antitrust Division, 10 Questions Indicating Anticompetitive Activ-
ity (n.d.) (unpublished memorandum).
311. See Rockenstein, supra note 308, at 159-60.
312. Some complaints may be handled by sending letters to alleged offenders,
informing them of the law, and advising them of the received complaint. Maclin
Interview, supra note 7.
313. MINN. STAT. § 325.907(2) (1978). Within the last four and one-half years,
22 civil investigative demands have been issued involving 110 business concerns. Ma-
clin Address, supra note 390, at 2.
314. See text accompanying notes 269-73 supra. Pre-complaint discovery is lim-
ited by the doctrines of relevancy and privilege and by the normal safeguards relating
to pretrial discovery. See MiNN. R. Civ. P. 26.02, 30.02, .04.
315. MINN. STAT. § 325.907(2)(a) (1978). The Minnesota Antitrust Division's pre-
complaint discovery efforts have been challenged three times. In each instance, the
courts have ordered compliance with the civil investigative demand. See In re Civil
Investigative Demand Served upon Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., No. 734207 (Minn. Dist.
Ct., Hennepin Cty., Apr. 4, 1977); In re Civil Investigative Demand Served Upon Lyon
Chemical, Inc., No. 408261 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Ramsey Cty., Dec. 9, 1975); In re K-Mart
[Vol. 63:907
MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW
If a criminal action is contemplated, the Antitrust Division must rely
on the investigatory powers of a grand jury.316 Once convened, how-
ever, the expansive subpoena powers of the grand jury and the Min-
nesota immunity statute3'1 provide immense investigatory power.
2. Assurance of Voluntary Compliance
The Antitrust Division may, after obtaining information relating
to a violation of the antitrust law and before filing a complaint, enter
into an assurance of voluntary compliance or discontinuance with the
violator.318 The inducements for agreeing to such a settlement include
the avoidance of possible litigation created stigma, the lack of any
estoppel or section 325.8024 "prima facie" value in such a settlement,
and the avoidance of a time-consuming and inconvenient suit that
might result in harsher penalties. The advantages to the Antitrust
Division include the same time and resource conservation factors.
An assurance of discontinuance takes the form of an affidavit
stating the identity of the party and his business, the nature of the
claimed violation, and the party's promise to discontinue the speci-
fied activity. The affidavit also often contains a stipulation for per-
formance by the party of "other equitable relief' or for the payment
of damages and costs to the state or some other injured party."9 The
assurance is filed with and subject to the approval of a district
court.32 0 Failure to comply is punishable through contempt proceed-
ings.2
3. Commencement of a Lawsuit
If the Antitrust Division decides that a violation is serious
Enterprises of Minnesota, Inc., No. 717179 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin Cty., Sept. 8,
1975).
316. See Rockenstein, supra note 308, at 160. Pre-commencement discovery
might still be obtained, however, if both a civil and criminal action against the party
in question are contemplated. Although admission of such evidence in the subsequent
criminal action could raise "search and seizure" problems, see generally State v. Rob-
ert L. Carr Co., [1978-1] TRADE CAsES 61,983 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., Mar. 31,
1978), the data could be used informally in deciding whether to proceed with the
criminal action. Once the grand jury is convened, such evidence may be properly
obtained for use in the criminal trial. Id.
317. MiNN. STAT. § 609.09 (1978). This provision removes the constitutional plea
of self-incrimination as an excuse for refusing to testify.
318. Id. at § 325.907(2)(b). In a criminal action, assurances of non-prosecution
may be used. Interview with Alan H. Maclin, Special Assistant Attorney General for
the State of Minnesota, Saint Paul, Minnesota (Dec. 15, 1978).
319. Rockenstein, supra note 308, at 162.
320. MINN. STAT. § 325.907(2)(b) (1978).
321. Id.
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enough to warrant litigation, it then must decide on the type of suit
to file. Several options are available: a civil suit for injunctive relief, "
an action for civil penalty, 3n a civil suit for damages,"4 a criminal
action,"' or some combination. The choice depends on the substan-
tive section violated, the nature and seriousness of the violation, the
sophistication and knowledge of the defendants, the duration of the
offense, the cooperation by the defendants, and whether the state or
its subdivisions suffered damage. 3  If the alleged violation is a con-
tinuing one, the Division is likely to seek injunctive relief. If there is
damage to the state or its subdivisions, it may also seek damages. If
the trebling of the damages is thought to be an insufficient sanction
for the alleged violation, then civil penalties may be asked for. Fi-
nally, if the alleged violation is a per se offense and appears willful,
criminal sanctions may be sought. Due to the procedural and policy
disadvantages of a criminal antitrust proceeding, 3 however, the Di-
vision is likely to seek such sanctions in only the most damaging
situations.328
4. Consent Decrees
After the action is commenced, the state still has the option of
settlement by the use of a consent decree. A consent decree is a final
judgment in an antitrust suit arrived at without any adjudication of
fact or law.31 In form, it differs from a decree in a litigated case only
in the introductory paragraph, which invariably reads:
By stipulation, the parties hereto consent to the making and entry
of the Order for Consent Judgment, without trial or adjudication of
any issues of fact or law herein and without this Order for Consent
Judgment constituting any admission by any party with respect to
any issues.no
The decree may contain stipulations as to the performance or pay-
ment of all civil remedies available under the Minnesota antitrust
322. Id. § 325.8020.
323. Id. § 325.8018(1).
324. Id. § 325.8019.
325. Id. § 325.8018(2).
326. Rockenstein, supra note 308, at 162, 164.
327. See generally L. SuLuvAN, supra note 123, at 768-69.
328. See, e.g., State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-1] Trade Cases 61,983
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., Mar. 31, 1978) (bid rigging).
329. The consent decree is often filed simultaneously with the complaint. Maclin
Interview, supra note 7.
330. See, e.g., State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-2] Trade Cases 62,052
(Minn. Dist. Ct., Lyon Cty., May 25, 1978).
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law.-' A consent decree has the same force as an adjudicated final
judgment except that it is not "prima facie" evidence against the
defendant in subsequent proceedings by another party. z Further, the
violation of a consent decree is not punishable by the extra civil fine
provided for in section 325.8018, subdivision 1.m
The use of consent decrees has been substantialm and is ex-
pected to increase.35 While extensive use of consent decrees benefits
the state enforcement effort by conserving enforcement resources that
would have been spent in complete trials and by reaching desired
results more quickly, their use can have disadvantageous side effects.
Post-consent decree enforcement is more difficult due to the decree's
lack of "prima facie" impact and because the threat of an extra civil
fine is absent. Moreover, consent decrees create no state antitrust
precedent.ml Such lack of precedent makes future enforcement more
difficult and deters private actions under the state law.37
V. SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS IN THE MINNESOTA
ANTITRUST LAW
Due to the relative newness of the Minnesota antitrust law and
the lack of decisions under it, the gaps and weaknesses that are inher-
ent in any law have not yet been fully exposed: Yet, possible improve-
ments in the Minnesota law can be suggested.
A. SUBSTANTIE ADDITIONS
The existing substantive provisions of the 1971 antitrust law
seem relatively sound. Improvement lies in addition to those provi-
sions. A provision specifically dealing with mergers and acquisitions,
331. See text accompanying notes 303-28 supra.
332. MiNN. STAT. § 325.8024 (1978); see notes 276-82 supra and accompanying
text. Moreover, consent decrees do not have collateral estoppel effect in subsequent
actions involving other parties. See Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 153 N.W.2d 199
(1967). Consent decrees may, however, operate as res judicata between the parties to
the same extent as if they had been rendered after contest and full hearing, see Panga-
los v. Halpern, 247 Minn. 80, 76 N.W.2d 702 (1956), unless the intention of the parties
is otherwise indicated. See Hentschel v. Smith, 278 Minn. 86, 153 N.W.2d 199 (1967).
333. MiN. STAT. § 325.8018(1) (1978). Such a violation is, however, punishable
by contempt of court.
334. Of the 15 civil actions filed by the state under the 1971 law, see notes 293-
302 supra, six have ended in consent decrees. See note 303 supra.
335. Rockenstein, supra note 308, at 166.
336. There is almost a complete absence of case law precedent involving the
current Minnesota antitrust law in the seven years after its passage. See text accompa-
nying notes 56-58 supra.
337. See generally Soma, supra note 112.
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modeled on section 7 of the Clayton Act,"' for example, should be
added to the Minnesota law. Under the federal law, one firm's acquis-
ition of another firm's assets or the merger of two firms can be a
violation of both the specific anti-combination standards of the Clay-
ton Act section 7-11 and the general restraint of trade standard of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.340 The standards for violation of the two
provisions differ, however. The Clayton Act is violated when "the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly. ' 3 Thus, the Clayton Act applies to
combinations even when there is only a reasonable probability that
the merger will, in the future, have anticompetitive results.12 More-
over, the Clayton Act may be applied even decades after the merger
if anticompetitive effects begin to manifest themselves.43 Under the
Sherman Act, by contrast, the merger must currently have sufficient
anticompetitive effects to cross the generally higher threshold of un-
reasonable restraints of trade."' The result of this difference is that
section 7 of the Clayton Act has much greater utility in merger cases.
The Justice Department, even with section 7 of the Clayton Act,
cannot adequately handle all the merger and acquisition violations
that affect Minnesota. The department simply lacks the resources to
deal with the large number of mergers each year. It therefore only
monitors the mergers affecting a multistate market.3 5 Furthermore,
there are certain segments of the economy, such as banking346 and
insurance, 47 in which Congress has chosen to rely on state regula-
tion.' 8 Finally, a large number of mergers are, because of their intra-
state nature, beyond the Clayton Act's jurisdiction.3 49
No provision analogous to the Clayton Act section 7 was included
in the 1971 Minnesota law, perhaps "because of the complexity of
338. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
339. Id.
340. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
341. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
342. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321 (1963).
343. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
344. See generally United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington,
376 U.S. 665, 671-72 (1964); United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240
F. Supp. 867, 950-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Inman, supra note 34, at 184.
345. See Stern, supra note 26, at 740; Inman, supra note 34, at 183.
346. See People's Say. Bank v. Stoddard, 351 Mich. 342, 88 N.W.2d 462 (1958).
347. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1976).
348. See Stern, supra note 26, at 740.
349. See, e.g., United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S.
271 (1975); FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). See also Stem, supra note 26, at
183, 185.
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economic issues raised" 50 and because of the "ambiguity" existing in
the federal merger law."' These two arguments have lost much of
their persuasive impact. The federal case law surrounding section 7
has been further explained,"s and much of the complexity present in
federal merger litigation is absent when the antimerger provision is
adopted for state antitrust uses."'
The only existing provision of the Minnesota antitrust law gov-
erning mergers, section 325.8013,111 is inadequate. Under section
325.8013, Minnesota can prohibit mergers only if the merger meets
the restrictive Sherman Act test. A series of local acquisitions may
take place before the combination reaches the proportion necessary
to amount to an unreasonable restraint of trade. 55 In the meantime,
several small competitors may be consumed and divestiture may
become so complex that no effective remedy is available.3s A state
provision paralleling section 7 of the Clayton Act therefore should be
enacted." 7
A second valuable substantive addition to the Minnesota anti-
trust law would include resale price maintenance and tying arrange-
ments in the list of per se violations established by section 325.8015.
Tying arrangements and vertical price fixing, both per se illegal
350. This was the justification for not including such a provision in the Uniform
Draft. UNIVORM DRr, supra note 46, Prefatory Note 2.
351. Stem, supra note 26, at 772.
352. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270, 294 (1962); Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
353. When an antimerger provision is adopted for state purposes, the complexi-
ties of determining the product and geographic markets are substantially reduced.
Arnold & Ford, supra note 46, at 110.
354. Federal case law interpreting § 1 of the Sherman Act as prohibiting the most
serious anti-competitive mergers indicates that § 325.8013 may be used in the same
way. The state Antitrust Division is presently trying a merger case under § 325.8013
in federal court under a theory of pendent jurisdiction. See Maclin Interview, supra
note 7.
355. Inman, supra note 34, at 184.
356. Id.
357. A possible model is the merger provision included in Richard Stem's 1961
proposal for a uniform state antitrust law: "It is unlawful for any person not a natural
person to acquire an asset from any person if the effect may be to lessen competition
substantially in any line of commerce." Stem, supra note 26, at 722. Following this
provision, Stem comments:
This section is based on section 7 of the Clayton Act. The proposed uniform
statute, unlike the federal statute, is not limited to acquistions made from a
corporation: any acquisition by a non-natural person is subject to the law,
whether the vendor is a corporation or a natural person. The other changes
in wording represent deletion of matter inapplicable to a state antitrust law
or shortening and simplification of the language.
Id. at 739-40 (footnotes omitted).
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under federal law,35 are clearly as "perniciouS" as other activity pre-
sently per se illegal under the Minnesota law.359 Although such
activities may be declared per se illegal under section 325.8013, their
addition to section 325.8015 would clarify any ambiguity about the
status of resale price maintenance and tying arrangements.
B. PROCEDURAL CLARICICATION
Under federal law, at least since the 1977 opinion in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois,36 indirect purchasers" ' may not bring antitrust actions
under section 4 of the Clayton Act.362 Since section 325.8019 of the
358. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (resale
price maintenance agreements per se illegal under Sherman Act § 1); Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (tying arrangment in which the
tying party has significant power in the tying product market and in which there is a
"not insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied product restrained is per se illegal
under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
359. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (citation
omitted):
Indeed, "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition. . ." They deny competitors free access to the market for the
tied product, not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a
better product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another
market. At the same time buyers are forced to forego their free choice be-
tween competing products.
See also Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)
(vertical price fixing is just as harmful to commerce and the public as horizontal price
fixing). But see Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 282, 283-84 (1975) (suggesting economic justification for restricted
distribution).
369. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
361. Indirect purchasers are those who do not deal directly with the antitrust
violator, but still are injured by the violation because of the higher prices they pay on
the goods they purchase. See generally Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 732
(1977).
362. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
The Court in Illinois Brick based its holding mainly on the argument that granting
standing to indirect purchasers would result in multiple liability. The decision relied
on the case of Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
In Hanover the Court had rejected the assertion that sellers who violate antitrust laws
might defend themselves, in actions brought by their distributors or retailers, by argu-
ing that the distributors were not damaged as they "passed on" the overcharges to the
customers. The Hanover Court disallowed the "passing on" defense because, first, it
is too difficult to determine if an overcharge has been passed on, and second, allowing
this defense would leave ultimate consumers as the only possible private plaintiffs. The
Hanover Court concluded that individual consumers suffer too little loss to be effec-
tive private enforcers.
Relying on the Hanover decision, the Illinois Brick Court reasoned that allowing
indirect purchasers to bring actions for damages would subject the seller to multiple
[Vol. 63:907
MINNESOTA ANTITRUST LAW
Minnesota act is modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act,363 the
doctrine of uniform construction3"' suggests that indirect purchasers
do not have a right to damages under the Minnesota antitrust act.
Such an interpretation is not desirable. The rule of Illinois Brick
leaves damaged consumers without recourse. This is especially signif-
icant in the case of the state itself, since most state purchases are
indirect in nature.3 5 Furthermore, although the Illinois Brick Court's
concern for "multiple liability" appears legitimate, that concern may
be alleviated by allowing an indirect purchaser to recover only that
portion of the overcharge passed on to him and by giving the seller a
"pass-on" defense."' Finally, the Minnesota legislature may have
intended to permit recovery by indirect purchasers since in 1971,
when Minnesota enacted its antitrust statute, federal courts allowed
indirect purchasers to recover damages under section 4 of the Clayton
liability-in suits brought both by distributors and ultimate consumers-for the same
offense if the distributor "passed on" the overcharges. Illinois Brick thus apparently
bars states and consumers from recovering damages under federal antitrust law. See
Minnesota Attorney General's Antitrust Division, Budget Activity Fiscal Summary
1979-81 Biennial Budget, at 2 (n.d.) (unpublished memorandum) (expressing concern
that suits in progress under federal law will be compromised) (on file at the Minnesota
Law Review).
The vitality of this aspect of Illinois Brick is currently unclear. In a case brought
in federal district court in Minnesota, consumers sued manufacturers for alleged price
fixing that resulted in higher retail prices. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933
(D. Minn. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd 99 S. Ct. 2326 (1979). The
plaintiff, a noncommercial user, would thus be considered an indirect purchaser barred
from recovery by Illinois Brick in the view of most commentators. See generally Com-
ment, Illinois Brick and Consumer Actions: The Passing Over of the Passing-On
Doctrine, 6 HoFsTRA L. REv. 361 (1976); Comment, Illinois Brick: The Death Knell of
Ultimate Consumer Antitrust Suits, 52 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 421, 451 (1977). Although
the Supreme Court in Reiter specifically refused to decide the applicability of an
Illinois Brick defense to the case, 99 S. Ct. at 2330 n.3, the Court ruled that standing
to sue exists under § 4 of the Clayton Act for consumers who purchase retail goods for
personal use, since they suffer an injury to "property" by paying artificially high
prices. Given this holding, the utility of the Illinois Brick "indirect purchaser" defense
is uncertain.
363. See text accompanying note 258 supra.
364. See text accompanying notes 65-83 supra.
365. While Minnesota has not recovered in enough actions under its relatively
new state antitrust law to provide relevant data, in federal cases Minnesota has suc-
cessfully proven damages from indirect purchases of over $2.4 million. Minnesota
Attorney General's Antitrust Division, State and Political Subdivisions, Antitrust Dis-
bursements for Indirect Purchases (n.d.) (on file at the Minnesota Law Review) (total
recovery for indirect purchases during the years 1971-1976). Accord, Maclin Interview,
supra note 7.
366. This parallels a federal bill introduced into but unpassed by the second
session of the 95th Congress. The bill is reported at 876 ANTrrRUsT & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA) Supp. No. 1 (Aug. 10, 1978). For an explanation of a "pass-on" defense, see
note 258 supra.
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Act. 117 Conforming section 325.8019 to current Clayton Act section 4
interpretation is thus not justified; 38 the issue of indirect purchasers'
rights to damages under the Minnesota antitrust law should be clari-
fied by amending section 325.8019 to expressly allow recovery by
indirect purchasers."'
C. REMEDY ADJUSTMENTS
Adjustments in the remedies provided by the 1971 law are
needed to more fully coordinate those remedies with the justifications
underlying them. Current penalties overlap in a way that defies justi-
fication. A defendant may be repeatedly sanctioned for the same
offense with no requirement that the courts take notice of prior sanc-
tions. Under federal law, a defendant may receive a three-year federal
jail sentence"' and a $1,000,000 federal criminal fine for a single
antitrust offense.3"1 For that same offense, he may then receive from
a Minnesota court the following punishment: a five-year jail sen-
tence,372 a $50,000 criminal fine,373 a $50,000 civil fine,374 a judgment
extracting treble damages in a state action, 375 and a judment extract-
ing treble damages in a private action, 3 1 all simultaneously and all
without consideration of the federal punitive action. 7
367. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
368. The rule of conformity with federal precedent has its greatest utility in
interpreting the substantive provisions of the Minnesota statute since it is in that area
that there is the greatest need for state-federal uniformity (based on the need for out-
Gf-court planning and legal compliance by businesses subjects to both laws, see text
accompanying note 86 supra) and for resort to a developed case law (based on the need
for both out-of-court planning and ease in litigation, see text accompanying notes 318-
20 supra). Standing to sue is a procedural matter that does not affect whether a certain
business activity is illegal, and therefore does not affect business planning. Its only
effect is on who can sue if the law is broken. Thus, the rule of harmonious construction
with federal case law has less weight in this matter.
369. This amendment could be modeled after the proposed federal amendment.
See note 366 supra.
370. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1976).
371. Id. §§ 1,2.
372. MINN. STAT. § 325.8018 (2) (1978).
373. Id.
374. Id. § 325.8018 (1).
375. Id. § 325.8019. While actual damages are arguably not punitive, the trebling
of those damages is justified as a punitive sanction. See text accompanying note 258
supra.
376. MINN. STAT. § 325.8019 (1978).
377. Note that such parallel punitive action on the federal and state level does
not constitute a problem of double jeopardy. See State v. End, 332 Minn. 266, 45
N.W.2d 378 (1950).
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Such unjustified duplication of penalty can be remedied. Federal
penalties for the same offense should be considered as mitigating
factors in a state court's assessment of fines.3 8 State civil and crimi-
nal penalties should be made mutually exclusive, the commencement.
of an action for one barring an action for the other.39 If the state
obtains a criminal or civil penalty for a specific offense, it should be
limited to actual, not treble, damages in a subsequent state damage
suit on that offense.3" The state should also be forbidden to recover
378. See OR. REv. STAT. § 646.760(3) (1977), which provides,
The court shall take into consideration in mitigation of any penalty
assessed under this section, any fine or penalty imposed against the defen-
dant by a United States court in a final judgment under sections 1 to 45 of
Title 15 of the United States Code, which the court finds to be based on the
same or substantially the same acts of defendant.
379. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.815(2) (1977), which states,
The commencement of trial seeking civil penalties in any action under
ORS 646.760 shall bar any subsequent criminal prosecution for violation of
ORS 646.725 or 646.730, based upon the same acts complained of. The
commencement of trial in a criminal prosecution for violation of ORS 646.725
or 646.730 shall bar any subsequent action for recovery of civil penalties
under ORS 646.760, based upon the same acts complained of, but shall not
bar a subsequent suit for injunctive relief under ORS 646.760.
This would not bar simultaneous criminal action for penalties and civil action for
injunctive relief or actual damages.
380. See OR. Rav. STAT. § 646.780 (1977), which provides,
(1) (a) A person including the state or any municipal corporation or
political subdivision injured in its business or property by a violation of ORS
646.725 or 646.730 may sue therefor and shall recover threefold the damages
sustained and the costs of suit, including necessary reasonable investigative
costs and reasonable experts' fees and a reasonable attorney fee, except that
the state may recover only its actual damages sustained, plus costs of suit
including necessary reasonable investigative costs and reasonable experts'
fees and a reasonable attorney fee, if it brings an action pursuant to ORS
646.760 or commences a prosecution under ORS 646.815 and subsection (3)
of 646.990.
(2) Unless there is a subsequent judgment that the court lacks jurisdic-
tion, the taking of any testimony at the commencement of trial on a com-
plaint filed under this section shall constitute an' absolute bar and waiver of
any right of plaintiff to recover damages from the same defendant under
federal law for the same or substantially the same acts of defendant.
(3) Unless there is a subsequent judgment that the court lacks jurisdic-
tion, the taking of any testimony at the commencement of trial on a civil
complaint for damages filed under the antitrust laws of the United States
shall constitute an absolute bar and waiver of any right of a plaintiff in such
action to recover damages from the same defendant under this section for
the same or substantially the same acts of plaintiff.
This, however, may lead to the problem of the state resorting to the federal courts,
where it could still get treble damages. While this might be prevented by legislation
barring the state from seeking federal treble damages if it has obtained state civil or
criminal penalties against the defendant in question, such legislation is likely to gener-
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treble damages and then seek civil or criminal penalties. A private
party should be limited to actual, not treble damages when using, as
"prima facie ' '351 evidence in his damage suit, a prior state judgment
in which the common defendant was sanctioned.32 Such revisions will
result in sanctioning a defendant only once for his offense while re-
dressing actual damage to the state and private parties.
A final remedial adjustment would allow recovery of reasonable
attorney fees and costs to a successful private plaintiff in an action
solely for injunctive relief. 3  The underlying rationale of encouraging
private enforcement of the state antitrust laws applies whether the
private plaintiff is seeking injunctive or monetary relief. Such an
amendment to the Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971 would help make
private suits seeking only injunctive relief more viable.3 8
VI. CONCLUSION
State antitrust activity is increasing nationwide. Minnesota is
participating in that trend with its new antitrust law and increasing
enforcement program. Interpretation of the new statute is aided by
reference to the first tentative draft of the Uniform State Antitrust
Act, the Illinois Antitrust Act, and Sherman Act precedents. While,
ate constitutional problems in that it would deny recourse to a valid federal law.
Similar constitutional issues may be involved in parts of the quoted Oregon statute.
See id. § 646.780(2), (3).
381. MINN. STAT. § 325.8024 (1978).
382. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.780(1)(b) (1977):
Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, in any action under
this section in which the plaintiff prevails solely on the basis of a judgment
or decree entered in a proceeding under sections 1 to 45 of Title 15 of the
United States Code or in another action by the state under ORS 646.760,
646.770 or this section, used as collateral estoppel against a defendant pur-
suant to ORS 646.805, plaintiff's recovery shall be limited to the actual
damages sustained and the costs of suit, including necessary reasonable
investigative costs and reasonable experts' fees and a reasonable attorney
fee.
This approach is justified since the trebling is no longer needed to sanction the
defendant nor is there as much concern about encouraging private enforcement when
there has already been state enforcement. Concern that a private party might not seek
his personal damages in such a situation due to the high costs of an antitrust suit is
reduced by the inclusion of the provision awarding costs and attorney fees to a success-
ful plaintiff.
383. MINN. STAT. § 325.8020 (1978). For examples of statutes including such a
provision, see CONN. GEs. STAT. ANN. J 35-34 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); HAwAII REv.
STAT. § 480-13(A)(2) (1968 & Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1977); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 83§ 41(2) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (limited
to permanent injunctions); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19:86.090 (Supp. 1977).
384. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 711.
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however, the new Minnesota antitrust law follows many aspects of
federal antitrust doctrine, its variance from federal law is evident in
its definition of "contracts, combinations, and conspiracies," its ex-
press enumeration of per se offenses, its per se treatment of exclusive
franchises and requirements contracts, and its stricter standard for
the offense of monopolization. Also distinct are the Minnesota provi-
sions for charter forfeiture and for collateral estoppel.
Minnesota's new antitrust statute is also distinguished by the
increasing attention paid it by the state Antitrust Division, -now one
of the most aggressive in the nation. Particularly important in this
enforcement effort are the state's refinement of its enforcement objec-
tives, its broad use of pre-complaint discovery, and the variety of
remedial measures available.
As the Minnesota antitrust law continues to have an increased
impact on the Minnesota legal and business community, scrutiny of
possible improvements must also increase. Suggested changes in-
clude the addition of provisions specifically addressing mergers and
clarifying the per se illegality of tying arrangements and resale price
maintenance. The ability of indirect purchasers to sue for damages
under the Minnesota law also needs clarification. Finally, the reme-
dies provided by the 1971 law need to be coordinated more fully with
their underlying justifications.
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